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ABSTRACT 
THE ILKHANID MONGOLS, THE CHRISTIAN ARMENIANS, AND THE ISLAMIC 
MAMLUKS: A STUDY OF THEIR RELATIONS, 1220-1335 
Lauren Prezbindowski 
November 15,2012 
This work seeks to fill a gap in the academic literature concerning the study of the 
Ilkhanid Mongols of the Middle East during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries CE 
using Armenian, Persian, Arabic, and Syriac primary sources in English translation. This 
study will analyze the triangular relationship among the Ilkhanid Mongols, the Kingdom 
of Cilician Armenia and Greater Armenia, and the Egyptian Mamluks to discern the 
Ilkhanate's impact in the Middle East. Although the Armenians became subjects of the 
Mongols, they did not gain many benefits from this partnership. In fact, their relationship 
proved to be overwhelmingly negative. Although the Mamluks were adversaries of the 
Mongols, they ultimately benefited greatly from their adversarial stance by establishing 
and legitimizing the rule of the martial mamluk caste. This thesis seeks to show the 
importance of studying this triangular relationship and its impact on the medieval Middle 
East. 
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In many ways, the thirteenth century CE can be characterized as 'the Mongol 
century.' By the middle of the century, most of Asia and large parts of Europe were 
under Mongol control, ruled by the four main branches of Chinggis Khan's family (the 
Chinggisids). Chinggis' four sons by his first wife, Borte, formed the four Chingissid 
houses. After Chinggis' s death, the sons fought over who would control the empire, even 
though Chinggis had designated his third son, Ogedei, as his successor. The eldest son, 
Jochi, led the Jochids and his successor Batu formed the Golden Horde, which controlled 
Russia and the northern Caucasus. Chinggis' s second son, Chagatai, founded the 
Chagatids and ruled the lands in Central Asia nestled between China and Persia. The 
third son, Ogedei, assumed the mantle of Great Khan, a position which ruled over all the 
other khans, and ruled from the Mongol capital in Karakorum [Qaraqorum]. He also 
controlled the lands in China. The fourth and youngest son, Tolui, ruled the lands to the 
west, which included Persia and the southern Caucasus. 
Inter-familial war remained a constant feature of the Mongol Empire and it was 
not until the mid 1200s that the Great Khan was able to order the consolidation, and in 
some cases reconquest, of Mongol-controlled lands. The Great Khan Mongke of the 
Toluids set his two brothers, Kublai and Hillegfi, to this task. Kublai would rule in the 
East (China) and Hillegu would rule in the West (Persia). 
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This thesis focuses on Hiilegu and his founding of the Ilkhanate. On his march 
west, the Mongol prince came into contact with numerous peoples and these relationships 
greatly defined how he would rule his new kingdom and how the Ilkhanate would exist in 
this political landscape. Mongol rule in Persia cannot be studied in a vacuum; scholars 
must understand the types of relationships the Ilkhans were involved in, what choices 
were available to them, and ultimately what defmed their relationships with each of the 
region's peoples. 
The arrival of a strong, permanent Mongol presence in Persia and the Caucasus 
greatly affected the politics of the area and brought a new political and military force into 
the mix. Some peoples, like the Armenians, saw the Mongols as a possible ally, whereas 
others, mainly the Egyptian Mamluks, saw the Mongols as a threat. Clearly, the 
Armenians and the Mamluks thought very differently about this new Mongol kingdom, 
and yet, they both had to address how they would interact with the Ilkhanid Mongols. 
The Armenians became the staunchest allies of the Mongols in the Middle East, while the 
Mamluks became the greatest threat to Mongol rule in the Middle East. 
Despite their opposing stances, the Armenians and Mamluks both sought to take 
advantage of the new Ilkhanid presence. In fact, the Armenians and Mamluks came into 
direct contact with one another for the first time through their relations with the Mongols. 
A triangular relationship quickly developed among the Ilkhanid Mongols, the Armenians, 
and Mamluks, in which the decision-making or actions of one power greatly affected the 
other two. This thesis seeks to present and study this triangular relationship in detail and 
posits that in order to understand the thirteenth century history of anyone of these 
kingdoms, the triangular Mongol-Armenian-Mamluk relationship ought to be studied. 
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This thesis ultimately seeks to show that the Mamluks, as enemies of the Mongols, 
benefited more from their relationship with the Mongols than the Armenians, who were 
allies of the Mongols. This will be shown through a calculation of advantages and 
disadvantages for both the Armenians and Mamluks in regards to their relationships with 
the Ilkhanid Mongols. 
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HISTORIOGRAPHY 
George Lane's work, Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian 
Renaissance, sought to show a more complex picture of the Mongol presence in Persia by 
showing distinctions between the first and second Mongol invasions of the area. Lane's 
work focused on the rule of the first Ilkhan Hiilegu by showing complexities not 
addressed by many other secondary sources, giving equal consideration to both the 
positives and negatives of the Mongol presence in Iran. However, Lane's text did not take 
into account the transfer of the Caliphate from Baghdad to Cairo, nor did he completely 
flesh out the lasting impact of expelling the Caliphate from Baghdad. Lane's work also 
seemed to focus on internal matters in the Ilkhanate, while bypassing the importance of 
foreign relations, specifically the Ilkhanate' s relations with the Egyptian Mamluks and 
Armenians. The Mongols and Mamluks contended for power in many different arenas, 
military, political, economic, and this would have impacted the Ilkhanate as a whole. This 
thesis will seek to incorporate more fully the impact of relations among the Mongols, 
Mamluks, and Armenians, especially in regards to early Mongol rule in Iran. 
Reuven Amitai-Preiss's work, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 
1260-81, wished to show the Mongol justifications for continued war against the 
Mamluks in Syria, as well as reasoning for Mamluk victory and Mongol defeat in Syria. 
Although the chief subject of this work was the Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, the study of this 
war is impossible without focusing on the role the Armenians had to play. Amitai-Preiss 
did not attribute much importance to the Mamluk drive to exact vengeance against the 
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Annenians, nor did he much address the obligations of the Mongols to act as protectors 
of the Annenians. This thesis will seek to address both of these major concerns and show 
how such obligations and campaigns impacted the overall Mamluk-Ilkhanid War. This 
thesis will also take into account the complexities of the conflict, showing how the 
Mamluks, Mongols, and Annenians not only warred on the battlefield, but also in the 
throne rooms, mosques, pilgrimage routes, and trade caravans. Although Amitai-Preiss 
touches on a possible conclusion to the conflict, this thesis will clearly state and show 
how the Mamluks emerged victorious in the Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, by transfonning the 
fierce Mongol enemy into a mighty political weapon. 
Another work on the study of Mamluk-Mongol relations is Anne Broadbridge's 
work, Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds. This work sought to 
study relations between the Ilkhanid and Jochid Mongols and the Mamluks through the 
specific lens of ideology and the motivations created by ideology. Broadbridge sought to 
compare and link the Mongol and Mamluk ideologies and the venues through which they 
communicated with one another. She especially focuses on the Mongol concept of the 
Divine Mandate, although she does not fully address its impact on relations. This thesis 
will not only show where and when the Divine Mandate was utilized, it will also show 
how the Mandate could be twisted against the interests of the Mongols, how it shaped the 
concepts and tenns of submission the Mongols offered their enemies, and how ultimately 
the Divine Mandate did not work to the benefit of the Mongols' allies, mainly the 
Annenians. Still further, the thesis will show how the Mongols' pursuit of the Divine 
Mandate worked to the benefit of the Egyptian Mamluks. 
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Although Broadbridge's analysis presented an extremely helpful understanding of 
the ideologies and kingship models of the Mongols and Mamluks, it did not address the 
Armenians or their ideology. At first glance this may seem appropriate given her study's 
focus, but this thesis will counter that even when studying Mamluk and Mongol relations 
as shaped by their ideologies, the impact of the Armenians is present. As much as the 
Muslirnlheathen dichotomy was used between the Mamluks and Mongols, the 
Muslim/Christian dichotomy was also used. The Ilkhanid Mongols were continually 
attacked for the supposed favoritism they showed Christians, including the Armenians. 
When Arabic authors recounted the horrors of the Mongol attacks they explicitly speak 
about the atrocities committed by Christian (Armenian) warriors against the Muslims. 
Therefore, Broadbridge's work is missing some of the complexities present in Mongol-
Mamluk relations as a result of excluding the study of the Armenians. 
Shifting now to Mongol-Armenian relations, Robert Bedrosian's work, The 
Turco-Mongol Invasions and the Lords of Armenia in the I3-Ilh centuries, examined the 
impact of the Mongol invasions on the Armenian lordly rulers (naxarar). Bedrosian's 
work also sought to utilize and validate primary sources from Armenian authors as there 
has been much dispute over the impartiality of these authors. Bedrosian's work focused 
on the political and domestic demands made by the Mongols and the impacts of the 
Mongol conflict in Greater Armenia. But Bedrosian gave little attention to the terms of 
submission the Armenian princes had to accept from the Mongols. The Mongols 
instituted heavy taxes in some regions, while demanding a vast quantity of supplies and 
support for its armies. The cost of reconstruction and recovery after the Mongol invasion 
is also not discussed, nor is the cost of lives considered. This thesis will seek to address 
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all of these issues and show how these demands negatively impacted the Armenians, both 
in the short and long tenn. Bedrosian also gave little attention to the impact of other 
external threats. These external threats, mainly the Mamluks, created the circumstances in 
which the Mongols placed their demands on the Annenian princes. As such, these 
external threats need to be factored into the study of Mongol-Annenian relations. An 
analysis of the Mamluk threat to the Armenians will also present an opportunity to 
analyze how the Mongol-Armenian alliance operated and what benefits it may have 
conferred on the Armenians. This thesis will present such an analysis and present the 
overall conclusion that the benefits the Armenians earned from their Mongol alliance did 
not outweigh its negative effects. 
Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog's work, The Mongols and the Armenians (1220-1335), 
argued that the vast Mongol Empire would have been impossible to run without 
establishing and maintaining local political ties in its conquered lands. This work also 
sought to show how both parties, the Mongol commanders (later Ilkhans) and the Greater 
Armenian princes, benefited from their relationship. The study relied strongly on the 
works of contemporary Annenian authors. Chiefly among them were: Kirakos of Ganjak, 
Vardan Arewelci, Grigor of Akner, Stepannos Orbelian, and Stepannos Episkopos. 
Although Dashdondog's work utilized some Persian sources, it mainly utilized Armenian 
and Georgian sources, which limited its scope. This work talked about some of the 
connections between the Armenians and Mongols with the Mamluks, but the lack of 
Arabic sources limited the depth of the infonnation provided. This thesis will take a more 
inclusive approach by utilizing Armenian, Arabic, Persian, and Syriac sources in 
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translation and will analyze both the benefits and drawbacks of the Mongol-Armenian 
relationship. 
For research on Armenian-Mamluk relations, Angus Donal Stewart's work, 
Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks: War and Diplomacy during the Reigns of He tum II 
(1289-1307), was consulted. Stewart's first argument was that no work has attempted to 
put the history of the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia into the wider context of the political 
climate ofthe Near and Middle East. Secondly, he stated that previous scholarship relied 
heavily on Crusader and Armenian primary sources, which usually left out the wealth of 
information Arabic sources have to offer. Stewart showed that one can clearly trace the 
Armenians' increasingly subservient status with respect to the Mamluk Sultanate chiefly 
through Arabic sources. He also analyzed the Cilicia Armenian-Ilkhanid Mongol 
relationship and succinctly showed the benefits the Armenians experienced from this 
partnership, but Stewart left some questions unanswered. Was the alliance with the 
Mongols beneficial in the long term for the Armenians? Would the Armenians and 
Mamluks have fought against one another without the Mongols? Such questions were left 
open to interpretation; this thesis will seek to answer these questions. 
Finally, Robert Irwin's work, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early 
Mamluk Sultanate 1250-1382, proved to be the best secondary source on showcasing the 
linkages among the Mongols, Armenians, and Mamluks. Irwin's work offered valuable 
insight into the mixing of Mongol and Mamluk cultures and peoples and how this mixing 
colored relations between the two. As with Stewart's work, Irwin left similar questions 
unanswered and did not provide a cost-benefit analysis of these relationships. This thesis 
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will present such an analysis and present the conclusion that the Mamluks benefited the 
most from their interactions with the Mongols and Armenians. 
Some of the sources mentioned above provided short-term analyses of certain 
benefits or aspects of a relationship, but no source ventured a longer-term analysis. A 
long-term analysis of these relationships and an analysis of advantages and disadvantages 
for all three powers are needed. This idea of advantages and disadvantages is particularly 
interesting and pertinent to studying the Mongol-Armenian-Mamluk relationship because 
the Mongols, especially the Ilkhanid Mongols, were new players to the region. Both the 
Armenians and the Mamluks consciously decided what type of relationship each would 
have with the Ilkhanid Mongols. Therefore, it is especially important to understand what 
choices were before them and how they went about making these decisions. Many such 
decisions are motivated by what is beneficial to the kingdom or its ruler, so a cost-benefit 
style analysis is useful in this thesis. This thesis will study what benefits each party 
sought to gain and then what the actual outcomes were and how these outcomes impacted 
those involved. This thesis will take a more holistic perspective by studying the triangular 
relationship among the Mongols, Armenians, and Mamluks. This thesis seeks to show 
that the Mamluks, as enemies of the Mongols, benefited more from their relationship 
with the Mongols than the Armenians, who were allies of the Mongols. This thesis seeks 
to address two gaps in present scholarship: the lack of a comprehensive analysis of 
Mongol-Armenian-Mamluk relations and the presentation of a definitive stance on who 
ultimately emerged victorious in the MongoliArmenian-Mamluk rivalry. 
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PRIMARY SOURCES 
This study utilized a wide variety of primary sources, all found in English 
translation. The majority of primary sources were written during the time period 
discussed, the mid thirteenth century through the mid fourteenth century CEo Several 
other sources written in the fifteenth and sixteenth centurires were consulted. The 
contemporary sources utilized were written in medieval Arabic, Armenian, Persian, 
French, Latin, and Syriac. 
Armenian Sources 
The most helpful Armenian source was the Tatarats Patmutiwn, more commonly 
known as 'the History of the Nation of Archers,' written by Grigor of Akner (1250-
1335).1 It described events relating to the Armenians from the time ofChinggis Khan to 
1273.2 Another important source from the period was the Patmutiwn Hayots (History of 
the Armenians) written by Kirakos of Ganjak (1200-1271).3 This work contained the 
political history of Annenia from its Christianisation (c. 301 CE) to 1266/67. The source 
was most important because it included the first and second Mongol invasions of 
Armenia and gave the most detailed account of the Mongols from the Armenian 
I Grigor of Almer, History of the Nation of Archers (the Mongols), trans. Robert P. Blake, Richard N. Frye, 
"Grigor of Almer's History of the Nation of Archers (the Mongols)," HJAS 12:3/4 (December, 1949): 269-
399. 
2 Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog, The Mongols and the Armenians (1220-1335) (Boston: Brill, 2011), 16-17. 
3 Kirakos of Ganjak, History of the Armenians, trans. John Andrew Boyle, "Kirakos of Ganjak on the 
Mongols," Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. 3, No.3, (1963). 
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perspective.4 Kirakos was captured along with his teacher Vanakan Vardapet by the 
Mongol commander Molar in Lorut, while taking shelter from the Mongol slaughter in 
Khwarazm. The Mongols pressed Kirakos into their service as a secretary; he wrote and 
read letters for the Mongol commanders in the summer of 1236, gaining invaluable 
insight into the Mongol ways.5 Vardan Arewelci (ca. 1200-1271) was also a pupil of 
Vanakan Vardapet and wrote during the same period.6 The works of Vardan and Kirakos 
often reinforced one another. Vardan's work, the Hawakumn Patmutean (Historical 
Compilation) was written as a chronicle, telling the history of the world from the time of 
the Biblical Genesis to 1267. Vardan provided a unique Armenian perspective in that he 
discussed clerical attitudes toward the Mongol invasion,7 and Vardan went to see HUlegii 
Khan in 1264 and was received with honor.8 
Although not directly quoted in the thesis, there were numerous other 
contemporary Armenian sources that were helpful in researching the period. These 
sources and authors included the Annuals written by Sebastatsi;9 the Patmutiwn 
Nahangin Sisakan (the History of the Siwnik' Province) written by Stepannos Orbelian 
(1250160-1304);10 the works of Hetum Patmich (Hetum the Historian), also known as 
Hayton; the fourteenth century work of Nerses Palients;ll the Armenian Colophons; 12 and 
4 More specifically Kirakos gives accounts of the crushing of Georgian forces in 1220/21; the submission 
ofCilician Armenian King Hetum I; Hetum I's campaigns into Syria; the Mongol sacking of Baghdad; the 
agreement between the Mongols and Armenians, see Dashdondog, the Armenians, 11-14. 
5 Kirakos also interacted with Greater Armenian nobles, including Pros Xalbakean, who participated in the 
Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1258, and Grigor Mamikoriean, who told him about Chinggis Khan, see 
Robert Gregory Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions and the Lords of Armenia in the 13th and 14th 
Centuries (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1979),25. 
6 Vardan Arewe1ci, The Historical Compilation, trans. Robert W. Thomson (Washington D.C., Dumbarton 
Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1989), 127. 
7 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 14-15. 
8 Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 29. 
9 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 19. 
10 Ibid. 17-18. 
11 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 25. 
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The Anonymous Chronicle in the Georgian History of Kartli. 13 All of these sources were 
helpful in gaining context for Annenia, Georgia, and Anatolia during the period under 
study. 
Persian Sources 
The most important source for the history of the Mongol conquest of Persia was 
the work of Ala aI-Din Ata Malik Juwayni (1226-83), called the Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha 
(History of the World Conqueror), completed circa 1260.14 Juwayni was a leading 
member of Hiilegii's administration and was an eyewitness to many of the important 
events during Hiilegii's reign. IS He helped to establish the new Mongol capital at 
Maragheh and witnessed the destruction of the Ismailis (Assassins). Hiilegii appointed 
Juwayni the governor of Baghdad after its conquest in 1258.16 Juwayni's history was 
quite different from others of the period because his perspective was from one who lived 
and worked under established Mongol rule in Persia, whereas many other authors 
experienced the Mongol invasions. 
The most important work for the late Ilkhanid period was Rashid al-Din's (1274-
1318) Sucessors of Genghis Khan. 17 Rashid aI-Din was the Grand Vizier of Ghazan and 
12 Colophons were writings usually found at the end of a manuscript and were most often made by the 
manuscript's copyist or recipient. They contained information such as the copyist's name, the year the 
manuscript was copied, and the year the colophon was made. They could also contain lengthy addenda on 
political and military developments, taxation, agriculture, and the conditions of the villages, towns, 
monasteries, and churches in the region, see Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 51. 
13 Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 57. 
14 Ala-ad-Din Ata-Malik Juwayni, The History o/the World Conqueror, trans. John Andrew Boyle 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1958. 
15 George Lane, Early Mongol rule in the thirteenth century Iran: a Persian Renaissance (New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 3. 
16 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 28. 
17 Rashid ai-Din, The Sucessors o/Genghis Khan, trans. John Andrew Boyle (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1971). 
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accompanied Ghazan on his last expedition, 1302-03, against the Mamluks. 18 Several 
other helpful sources that were utilized included Khwaja Nasir ai-Din Tusi's (1201-74)19 
Zij al-Ilkhani (Ilkanic Tables) and Minhaj aI-Din Saraj Juzjani's the Nasiri Tables. 20 Tusi 
provided a factual unembellished account of the fall of Baghdad in 1258, in which he 
took part and he was a financial adviser to both Hiilegii Khan and Abaqa Khan.21 
Juzjani's work covered the first stage of the Mongols' conquest of Armenia and had been 
a witness to this Mongol conquest. Both Juzjani and Juwayni recounted some of the same 
events, which gave credence to both. 
Although not directly quoted in the thesis, there were numerous other 
contemporary Persian sources that were helpful in researching the period. These sources 
included Abdallah ibn Fazlallah of Shiraz's (also known as Wassaf)22 Tarikh-i Wassaf 
(The History ofWassaj); Abu al-Qasem Abdollah Qashani's Tarikh-i O/jeitii (The 
History ofO/jeitii);23 Hamd Allah Mustawfi Qazini's Tarikh-i Guzida (the Selected 
History) and the Nazhat al-Qulub (Pleasure of the Hearts); and the works of Shams al-
Din Ahmad al_Aflaki.24 All of these sources provided helpful contextual information on 
Persia during the time period under study. 
18 Rashid-a! Din, The Successors ofGenghis Khan, 4. 
19 Ibid. 6, 8. 
20 Lane, Persian Renaissance, 3. 
21 Ibid. 8. 
22 Ibid. 6-7. 
23 Ibid. 6-7. 
24 Ibid. 7. 
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Arabic Sources 
The most important primary source found in a complete English translation was 
Ibn al-Athir's (1160-1233) al-Kamil jil-tarikh (Complete History).25 AI-Athir relied on 
second hand accounts of refugees from the Mongol conquests26 and his work contained 
information relating to the Mongols in Syria. The other Arabic primary sources were 
found in English through secondary sources. One such example was Baybars al-
Mansuri's (d. 1324-25) Kitab al-Tuhfa al-mulukiyya jil-dawla al-Turkiyya, 27 a chronicle 
of the Mamluk sultans from their beginning (c. 1250) to 1311-12. AI-Mansuri served the 
Sultans Mansur Sayf aI-Din Qalawun al-Alfi and ai-Nasir Muhammad, during whose first 
two reigns al-Mansuri held the great office of dawadar (executive secretary). By 1312 al-
Mansuri was appointed vice regent in Egypt, the highest appointed office in the 
Sultanate. The extant pieces ofal-lazari's (d. 1338) work, Hawadith al-zaman,28 
provided pertainent information on the Mongols through the lens of a Mamluk author, 
while preserving the observations of earlier Mamluk authors. 
Although not directly quoted in the thesis, there were numerous other 
contemporary Arabic sources that were helpful in researching the period. These sources 
included Sayfal-Din Abu Bakr ibn al-Dawadari's Kanz al-Durar wa-Jami al-Ghurar (the 
Treasure of Pearls and Trove of the Radiant);29 Shihab ai-Din Ahmad al-Nuwayri's 
25 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fil-tarikh, Part 3, The Years 589-62911193-1231, The Ayyubids after Saladin and 
the Mongol Menace, trans. D.S. Richards (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008). 
26 Lane, Persian Renaissance, 177. 
27 P. M. Holt, "Literary Offerings: a genre of courtly literature," ed. Thomas Philipp, Ulrich Haarmann, The 
Mamluks in Egyptian politics and society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4. 
28 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 5. 
29 No English translation available. 
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Nihayat ai-Arab fi Funun al-Adab (All That Can be Desired in the Scribal Arts);3o Ibn 
Fadl Allah al-Umari's Masalik al-Absar fi Mamalik al-Amsar (Paths of Discernment into 
the Kingdoms of the Lands);31 Shams aI-din Ibrahim b. Abd aI-Rahman al-Qaysarani's al-
Nur al-laih wal-durr al-sadihfi stifa mawlana ai-sultan ai-Malik al-Salih;32 Abul-Fida's 
(d. 1332) Kitab al-Mukhtasar (Compendious Book),33 and Taqi aI-Din Ahmad aI-
Maqrizi's comprehensive history of Egypt. 
Yet another helpful source was the work ofIbn Abd al-Zathir (1233-1293), who 
was a biographer of Sultan al-Zathir Rukn aI-Din Baybars al-Blmduqdari and wrote the 
al-Rwad al-zahir fi sirat ai-Malik al-Zathir. This work was of importance for its coverage 
of Baybars's role at the battle of Ayn lalut in 1260.34 Shaft b. Ali al-Asqalani (d. 1330), 
the nephew ofIbn Abd al-Zathir, also wrote a biography of Baybars Bunduqdari (after 
Baybars's death) called the Husn al-manaqib al-sirriyya al-muntazaa min al-sira al-
Zahiriyya. 35 All of these sources provided helpful contextual information on Egypt and 
Syria on the period under study. 
Other Language Sources 
The works of Bar Hebraeus, the Political History of the Worldand the 
Chronology of Gregory Abu al-Faraj, both in Syriac, were consulted in depth.36 Both 
works were utilized in full English translation. Bar Hebraeus' s history of the early 
30 No English translation available. 
31 No English translation available. 
32 The exact translation of the title could not be found, but the work certainly concerns the reign of the 
Ayyubid sultan ai-Malik al-Salih, who ruled Egypt from 1240 to 1249, see Holt, "Literary Offerings," 7-8. 
33 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 29. 
34 This work was basically a biography of Baybars al-Bunduqdari, see Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology, 
266. 
35 Holt, "Literary Offerings," 5. 
36 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 30. 
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Ilkhans, found in the Political History of the World, was often based on his own 
experiences and he was allowed access to the Ilkhan's libraries in Maragheh and Tabriz. 
The Chronology of Gregory Abu al-Faraj aided in comparing Syriac Christian to 
Armenian Christian sources, which shed light on Mongol-Christian and Christian-Muslim 
relations. 
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THE PRELIMINARY HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
As this study revolves around the Mongols in Persia, a cursory understanding of 
the Mongols and their move into Persia is needed. The Mongols first emerged on the 
world stage under the unifying leadership ofChinggis Khan (1167-1227), known to many 
Western audiences as Genghis Khan, in the beginning of the thirteenth century. After his 
unification of the Central Asian nomadic tribes and his conquest of the Xi Xia, Chinggis 
Khan wished to establish trade between his lands and Persia. To this end he sent an 
ambassador to Sultan Mahamad of Persia along with a train of 400 merchants to buy 
wares in Persia. Unfortuntately, the Sultan murdered the Mongol ambassadors and 
merchants, which incited Chinggis' s great anger and brought war upon the Khwarazm 
Empire, which constituted much of Iran and Afghanistan and all of Transoxiana.37 
Chinggis succeeded in defeating the Khwarazm Empire, sacking its capital Samarqand, 
by 1220. 
The Mongols' first campaign into Persia (1219-1221) and the Caucasus caused 
great destruction with many cities sacked; thousands were killed; and infrastructure, 
including the vital irrigation systems, was destroyed. The Mongols left few forces to 
maintain control of Persia and the Caucasus, as most of the army was needed to confront 
the Chinese kingdoms. The small force that was left was led by the Mongol generals 
37 Ibn a1-Athir, A l-Kiimil fil-tarikh, quoted from Robert Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The 
Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250-1382 (Carbondale: Southern lllinois University Press, 1986), 13. 
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Chormaghan, Eljigidei, and Baiju/8 and it was they who later complained to the Great 
Khan Mongke (r. 1252-1259) concerning the Ismailis (Assassins) and Caliphate 
aggressions.39 It was not until 1257 that the Mongols sought to consolidate their power in 
the Middle East. The Great Khan Mongke commanded his brother Hiilegii to go west 
with a great army to subdue those lands once under the control of the Mongols by 
defeating the troublesome Ismailis and the Caliph of Baghdad.4o Hiilegii set out in 1257 
but did not arrive in Persia unti11259. 
The Mongols only completed their conquest of Armenia after three campaigns 
from 1239 to 1244.41 The Mongols richly rewarded those who submitted (this acted as an 
inducement to the hesitant) while simultaneously devastating the lands of those who still 
resisted.42 According to Grigor of Akner, Chinggis Khan allegedly said to his commander 
Chormaghan: "It is the will of God that we take the earth and maintain order, and impose 
the (y)asax, that they abide by our command and give us tzyu, mal, tayar, and ypcur. 
Those, however, who do not submit to our command or give us tribute, slay them and 
destroy their place, so that the others who hear and see should fear and not act thus.,,43 
This was the policy set forth in dealing with resistors and only a handful of Armenian 
princes were brave or foolish enough to attempt resistance. 
The other area of Armenian rule that was greatly affected by the Mongols was the 
kingdom of Cilician Armenia, which was located on the southern coast of Anatolia near 
38 Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260-81 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9. 
39 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 122. 
40 Concurrently, the Great Khan M5ngke also commanded another brother Kublai to consolidate the 
Chinese lands to the east. Kublai did so, establishing the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty in China. 
41 The first Mongol campaign took Ani and Kars in 1239, the second took Karin in 1242, and the third with 
the defeat of the Seljuk Sultan in 1244, see A.E. Redgate, The Armenians (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1998),259. 
42 Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 174. 
43 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 30l. 
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the northern border of Syria.44 The kingdom of Cilician Armenia's relationship with the 
Mongols began when its king, Hetum I, had the foresight to surrender to the Mongols 
before they threatened his lands: "Then the pious and Christ-crowned King of Armenia, 
Hetum ... taking counsel, came to the decision to submit to the Tatars [Mongols] and give 
them tribute and xalan so as not to let them into their own God-created and Christ-formed 
country.,,45 
Hetum I further showed his allegiance to the Great Khan by handing over the 
royal family of the Sultan of Rum, who had sought refuge at Hetum's court from the 
Mongols.46 For his actions, Hetum was allowed to keep his kingdom and was given 
vassal status, in which he had to supply the Mongols with troops and supplies at any 
moment, pay taxes, and maintain loyalty. In return, the Mongols promised military 
protection against Armenia's Muslim neighbors.47 
Surprisingly, the Egyptian Mamluks owed their very existence to the Mongols. As 
the Mongols grew in power they swept west across the Eurasian steppe, pushing other 
weaker nomadic tribes still farther west until they reached the Near East, the Black Sea 
region, and the eastern edge of Europe. One such group, the Kipchak Turks, were 
enslaved and bought by eager Egyptian buyers, who needed large numbers of fearsome 
warriors, which they called mamluks. The Mongol invasions of the 1220s and 1230s 
created a plentiful slave population from the many refugees.48 
44 Edmond Schutz, "Annenia: A Christian Enclave in the Islamic Near East in the Middle Ages," ed. 
Michael Gervers, Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi, Conversion and continuity: indigenous Christian communities in 
Islamic lands, eighth to eighteenth centuries (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990),225-
26. 
45 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 309. 
46 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 80. 
47 Ibid. 80. 
48 Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 17-18. 
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Mamluks could come from almost any people, but the Turks were prized and 
sought after because of what contemporaries saw as their inherent military quality. The 
Turks, like the Mongols, were a nomadic people where violence was part of daily life. 
Nomads often raided the herds of livestock and horses of other tribes and imprisoned 
those they defeated in battle to be sold as slaves. Turks often sold other Turks acquired 
through war or, during times of famine and hardship, families sold their children.49 
Both Mamluks and Mongols were military elites of the Eurasian steppe who ruled 
over large Muslim populations and based their armies on disciplined masses of mounted 
archers. The Mamluks took up a sedentary lifestyle once they began ruling in Egypt and 
functioned as an urban military class. They stayed connected to their nomadic heritage 
through their continual purchasing of slaves from the Black Sea, especially from the 
Kipchak tribe. Once the Kipchak slaves were brought to Egypt they were trained to 
become mamluks, the Islamic faith's most ardent supporters and holy warriors.50 
During the reign of the Mamluks in Egypt, enslavement as a mamluk was seen as 
a step toward acquiring power and position within the Sultanate.51 It was a respected 
position that was given great responsibilities and power. Often times, mamluk regiments 
constituted the sultan's royal bodyguard. 52 Mamluks were first and foremost military 
slaves, but they could also perform ceremonial or administrative tasks. Mamluks served 
as cupbearers, equerries, and falconers, but also provincial governors, major-domos of 
the royal household or treasurers. The slavery of the mamluks allowed them to develop 
their martial skills, especially with time consuming and difficult skills such as horse 
49 Ibid. 5. 
50 Ibid. 18. 
51 Ibid. 4. 
52 Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 4-5. 
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archery. In addition, it enabled the establishment of loyalty due from the mamluk to his 
master/owner, or ustadh. A mamluk was often taught other skills beyond the martial. 
They were often taught to speak Arabic and sometimes taught to read and write Arabic as 
well. 53 
In 1240, Sultan AI-Salih Ayyub created a new elite corps of mamluks, called the 
Bahriyya,54 comprised mainly of Kipchak mamluks. AI-Salih relied heavily on the 
military advice of his Bahriyya amirs (chieftain/commander), not trusting in his Ayyubid 
dynastic family, which had ruled Egypt since 1174. AI-Salih died in 1249 amidst a great 
military crisis and subsequent political wars followed. 55 From this power struggle it 
became clear that the Bahri mamluks were more powerful than previously thought, but it 
was the threat of the Mongols that finally thrust the Bahri to the throne in 1250. 
The history of the Egyptian Sultanate from 1249 to 1259 was one of complex 
political maneuverings and murders. Powerful amirs, Ayyubid princes, and Bahri 
mamluks used young Ayyubid princes as figureheads on the throne, while they fought 
amongst themselves. AI-Muizz Aybak claimed the throne in 1257, but was murdered 
soon after. His young son, the fifteen year old aI-Mansur Nur aI-Din Ali, was put on the 
throne to keep up the fayade of legitimacy. Ultimately it was AI-Muizz Aybak's most 
favored mamluk, Qutuz al-Muizzi, who gained power. 56 Qutuz took direct control of the 
throne in 1259 soon after hearing that the Mongols had entered Syria.57 
53 Ibid. 4-5. 
54 The title of 'Bahriyya' refers to where this corps was garrisoned; on the island of Rawda on the River 
Nile (Bahr ai-Nil) outside of Cairo, see Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 18. 
55 The Ayyubid prince of Aleppo, ai-Nasir Yusuf, occupied Damascus and would later playa prominent 
role in Ayyubid/Mamluk/Mongol relations, see Irwin, Early Mamluk Sultanate, 22. 
56 Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 28-29. 
57 Ibid. 32-33. 
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The Mamluks came into direct contact with the kingdom of Cilician Armenia as a 
result of the Mongols; the Armenians were military allies of the Mongols during the long 
Ilkhanid-Mamluk conflict. Armenian incursions into northern Syria against the Mamluks 
were unsuccessful and the Mamluks sought to exact vengeance against the Armenians for 
their foolish raids. The Mamluks sent multiple raids into Cilicia, devastated the land and 
ultimately forced the Armenians to accept a greatly disadvantageous peace in 1285. The 
Mamluks ultimately brought the Cilician Armenians under heel in 1375, when they 
captured the Cilician royal family and the capital of Sis. 
22 
THE SECOND MONGOL INVASION OF PERSIA 
Mongke of the Toluid family was elected Great Khan in 1252; among his first 
acts was to enact a new expansionist phase for the Empire, both by consolidating 
previously held lands and conquering new areas. Mongke assigned one of his brothers, 
Hulegii, to reconquer the lands ofIran and the southern Caucasus. Rashid aI-Din 
described: "To conquer the lands of the enemies ... until you have many summer and 
winter camps."S8 Reuven Amitai-Preiss further described HUlegii's charge: "To enact the 
laws ofChinggis Khan in the lands from the River Oxus (Jayhun) up to the edge of the 
land of Egypt."s9 HUlegii was then given instructions to carry on further conquests of new 
lands as he saw fit; Syria was certainly a goal and the primary sources hint that Egypt 
was within the sights of the Great Khan.60 
HUlegii's mission first dictated that before he could conquer new lands, he had to 
deal with the rebellious elements within the Mongols' realm. Mongol commanders in 
Iran had sent complaints to the Great Khan concerning attacks fi'om the Ismailis 
(Assassins) and mountain rebels and the increased aggressiveness of the Caliph of 
Baghdad. Therefore, HUlegu's first task was to eliminate the Ismailis concentrated in 
eastern Iran and south of the Caspian Sea. The second task was to put down the rebellious 
Kurds and Lurs and the third was to render the submission of the Caliph.61 
58 Rashid ai-Din, Successors, quoted in Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 12. 
59 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 12. 
60 Ibid. 13. 
61 Ibid. 12. 
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Hiilegii left his ordu (camp) in February 1254 for the Middle East, arriving 
outside Samarqand in September 1255.62 As Hiilegii's army marched across the Middle 
East, he made appeals to the various local and regional rulers to offer submission to him 
as a representative of the Great Khan. He also demanded that they prepare for his arrival 
into their lands and be able to provide for his army. This type of material support was 
expected of any group who became vassals of the Mongols. Juwayni described the 
process through which the Mongols made demands of their vassals: 
... The emirs and local rulers, whoever they were, began to prepare 
provisions (ulufa) and get together tuzghu or offerings of food; and they 
set down their offerings at every stage [of the army's advance). At the 
same time the Mongol and Moslem emirs brought herds of mares and each 
in turn manufactured qumiz until the troops passed on to another emir. 
And the route along which it was calculated that the World-King would 
pass was cleared ... and bridges were built over the rivers and streams and 
boats held in readiness at the ferries. 63 
As part of his demands for submission, Hiilegii also demanded local leaders to 
provide military forces to take part in his campaign across the Middle East. Rashid aI-Din 
explained that "when Hiilegii Khan was coming to Persia the decree was issued that from 
each of the princely houses a prince should join him with an army to assist him ... ,,64 
Hiilegii began his campaign in 1256, acquiring staunch allies in King Hetum I ofCilician 
Armenia and the Greater Armenian lords under the Georgian King David VII DIu (r. 
1247-1270).65 The Armenians would remain the Mongols' strongest allies throughout 
Hiilegii's campaign. The Armenians and Georgians had supported the Mongols in their 
62 Lane, Persian Renaissance, 20. 
63 Juwayni, The History o/the World Conqueror, 607-610. 
64 Rashid aI-Din, Successors, 104. 
65 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 96, 119. 
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past campaigns, particularly against the Sultanate of Rum, and they could be counted 
upon to provide forces again. 
Local allies were also needed because the Mongol force was too small to 
accomplish its goals alone. It was standard practice to use local forces as a significant 
portion of the Mongols' forces in any given area. Local forces were often led by small 
Mongol contingents as was the case in much of the Persian theater of operations. Juwayni 
related how Mongol forces were used in Persia: "The World-King's forces encamped in 
the district of Talaqan and he ordered the armies of Kerman and Yezd to besiege the local 
castles such as Aluh-Nishin, Mansuriya and several others; and he strengthened the hand 
of these troops with a force of Mongols who were their mainstay (muawal).,,66 Juwayni 
went on to list numerous local Persian leaders who joined Hiilegii in his campaign to 
retake the Middle East in 1260: 
When the Royal banners had passed through that region the Supreme 
Minister (sahib-i-azam) Masud Beg and the emirs of Transoxiana joined 
his [Hiilegii's] train ... Muhammad [Shams-ad-Din Muhammad, founder of 
the Kart dynasty of Her at], son of Miqdat, came toward to welcome the 
King in advance of all his peers and equals and was distinguished amongst 
mankind by many marks of favor and honor ... [Upon reaching Kish] the 
emir Arghun and most of the chief men ofKhorasan reached them and 
offered their presents.67 
Many of these Persian leaders were Ayyubid princes, of the Ayyubid dynastic family in 
Egypt, which the Mamluks deposed. This was also true in Syria, where the Mongols and 
Mamluks contended for power. These princes remained strong in their localized areas 
and could prove to be valuable allies for the Mongols (and the Mamluks). The most 
important Ayyubid rulers for the Mongols were those who ruled in Syria. On the eve of 
66 Juwayni, World Conqueror, 626. 
67 Ibid. 612.13. 
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the Mongol invasion, Syria was split among three Ayyubid princes: aI-Nasir Yusufb. al-
Aziz Muhammad, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus; aI-Mansur Muhammad b. aI-Muzaffar 
Mahmud, ruler of Hama; and AI-Mughith Umar b. al-Adil Abu Bakr b. al-Kamil 
Muhammad, ruler of Karak .68 
The Mongols were only partially successful in gaining the service of these three 
strong princes. AI-Nasir Yusufb. al-Aziz Muhammad, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus, 
vacillated between supporting the Mongols and Mamluks, ultimately to his great 
detriment.69 AI-Mansur Muhammad b. aI-Muzaffar Mahmud, ruler of Hama, had been on 
the Mamluk side since the Mongol invasion and he was rewarded by the Mamluks by 
receiving his kingdom again and the lands of Maarrat al-Numan and Barin.7o AI-Mughith 
Umar b. al-Adil Abu Bakr b. al-Kamil Muhammad supported the Mongols in his capacity 
as the ruler of Karak. Other Muslim rulers who aided the Mongols included Badr aI-Lulu 
ofMosul, AI-Said Hasan of Banias, and many others.7l Prince ai-Ashraf Musa b. al-
Mansur Ibrahim of Horns marched into battle with the Mongols at Ayn Jalut, but he 
switched sides during the battle and his timely desertion helped defeat the Mongols.72 
Once Htilegii had his armies assembled and his allies secured, he went against the 
fortresses of the Ismailis, who were seen as a great threat to the people of the region. The 
Syrian chronicler, Bar Hebraeus, described the victory of the Mongols over the Ismailis: 
"By means of these blessed captures God had mercy on the kings of the Arabs and 
Christians who lived in terror and trembling through the fear of the Ishmaelites [Ismailis] 
68 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 19-20. 
69 Yusufhad formally submitted to the Mongols before HUlegii's arrival in 1241. When HUlegU conquered 
Iran, Yusuffailed to show proper respect as a vassal, by failing to send gifts, troops, or even recognition to 
the khan. After false showings of reconciliation, Yusuftook a belligerent stance against HUlegU and sought 
the aid of the Mamluks. 
70 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 45. 
7J Dashdondog, the Armenians, 142. 
72 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 45. 
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who were carriers of daggers and were shedders of innocent blood.,,73 The Muslim 
peoples were very keen to aid the Mongols in this pursuit and " ... orders were then given 
for the fastening of banners and standards [to lances] and the massing of the troops for 
the purpose of making holy war and uprooting the castles of the Heresy. And all the 
forces in that region, whether Turks or Taziks, put themselves in readiness.,,74 The 
Armenians' first campaign alongside Hiilegu occurred during the Ismailis campaign in 
1256; one of their greatest achievements was the conquest of Alamut. 
After his victory over the Ismailis, Hiilegti marched to the city of Baghdad and 
called upon Caliph Mustasim to surrender the city. According to George Lane: 
Hiilegti was anxious to avoid further bloodshed and urged his assistant and 
scholar Nasir aI-Din Tusi to compose a letter to the Caliph, beseeching 
him to see reason and to desist from his continued stubbornness. Hiilegti 
promised good fortune and a robe of honour for the Caliph Mustasim if he 
should comply with the inevitable. However, Nasir aI-Din Tusi's letter 
was rejected and the Caliph sent his response with insults and verbal 
abuse.75 
Vardan Arewelci wrote: "Hulawu [Hiilegti] slew with his own hands the Caliph, whose 
name was Mustasr.,,76 After the capture of the city in 1258, Hiilegti executed the Caliph 
and secured the city.77 It should be noted that "there is little in the sources to suggest that 
Hiilegti decided on the Caliph's fate or indeed the fate of Baghdad out of malice, a thirst 
for blood, or a particular penchant for violence ... though Hiilegti was resolute once he had 
73 Bar Hebraeus, Political History, quotes from Dashdondog, the Armenians, 126. 
74 Juwayni, World Conqueror, 615. 
75 Lane, Persian Renaissance, 29. 
76 Vardan, Compilation, 217-18. 
77 HUlegfi's campaign continued with the sacking of Aleppo in 1260 with the aid of the Cilician Armenian 
king Hetum I and his son-in-law Bohemond VI, Prince of Antioch and Count of Tripoli, see M. Chahin, 
The Kingdom of Armenia (London: Croom Helm, 1987),287. 
27 
determined upon [the city's] destruction, it should be noted that the devastation was 
selective and not all were killed and not all was destroyed.,,78 
Once Hiilegil had consolidated his gains, he officially founded the Mongol 
kingdom of the Ilkhanate with its center at Maragheh. Hiilegil ruled this new kingdom on 
behalf of the Great Khan, acting as a lesser khan in the Mongol Empire. Hiilegil took the 
title of Ilkhan,79 although there is no evidence that Mongke Khan bestowed this title on 
him. It is clear that the title was in use by 1259-60 during Hiilegii's reign. The origins of 
the title 'ilkhan' are not entirely known; the majority of scholars believe it derived from 
the old Turkic title, elkhan, which meant 'ruler.' Another meaning is 'subservient or 
submissive ruler [khan]. ,80 
78 Lane, Persian Renaissance, 28. 
79 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 14. 
80 Ibid. 14. 
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TERMS OF SUBMISSION TO THE MONGOLS 
The first standard Mongol procedure Hiilegii enacted was the issuing of demands 
for surrender and submission from all of the rulers and peoples he encountered. The 
demand for surrender was simple and can be seen in numerous primary sources. One 
such example was when the Mongol military commander AsIan made an appeal to the 
Armenian lord Elikum Orbelian to surrender. According to Bedrosian, Vardan Arewelci 
related AsIan's offer: "Make friends with us [the Mongols]; come to us, and you will find 
many benefits from us. Otherwise, no matter how long you sit on your rock [in his 
fortress], we shall not quit this land. For God has given us this [land] as patrimony, and 
when you come forth, it will be the ruin of you and your tun [House].,,81 Faced with the 
real possibility of destruction, Elikum subsequently surrendered. Many lords found 
Mongol demands to be palatable compared to the alternative: death. 
Mongol terms of submission generally included the following: war service in the 
khan's armies; supplying the Mongol armies; extraction of taxes from the subjugated 
people; submission must be given in person to the Great Khan in Karakorum; the 
subjugated people must be obedient in all ways to the Mongols. Those princes and lords 
who submitted made visits to Hiilegu at Maragheh in 1258, including vassals from 
Mosul, Fars, Rum, and Caucasia. 82 According to Bedrosian, Kirakos related the surrender 
of the Armenian prince Hasan Jalal: "the [Mongols] ... ordered him to come to them each 
81 Vardan, Compilation, quoted from Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 176. 
82 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 135. 
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year for war service, and ingenuously to be obedient to them.,,83 Kirakos then related the 
terms of Hasan Jalal's surrender; in return for Hasan Jalal's submission, Hiilegfi "honored 
him and gave him back his land and other lands besides ... ,,84 
Upon surrender, the Mongols often treated their enemies with clemency. An 
analysis of the treatment of the Islamic ruler, Rukn ad-Din, shows that even after 
engaging in open hostilities with the Mongols, he was able to surrender and was treated 
well by Hiilegii: 
And he [Hiilegii] again sent elchis [messengers] in advance to say that he 
had put into effect his intention to move forward against Rukn-ad-Din. 
The latter had added to his former crimes hollow excuses and feeble 
evasions but if he would make his heart sincere again and come forward to 
meet the King, he would read the lesson: 'What is past is past' over his 
crimes, and cast the glance of forgiveness and condonation upon his 
offenses, and show the teeth of assent in the face of his requests. 85 
The Mongols also showed favor to their vassals through marriage. But these links 
were not used to create any sense of equality between the Mongols and their vassals; 
rather, the Mongols used these marriage links to further control their vassals and increase 
their indebtedness. This inequality can be seen in the treatment of Rukn-ad-Din. Once he 
submitted, all of his possessions were placed under Mongol control; his army was divided 
up among the emirs and he had to accompany Hiilegii to the royal ordu in the region of 
Hamadan. Hiilegii sent elchis to fetch the remaining enemy commanders, assess the 
treasuries in the captured castles and guard the enemy castles until larger Mongol forces 
could arrive. According to Juwayni: "As for Rukn-ad-Din he was viewed with attention 
and kindness by the King ... at the King's command, [a Mongol wife] was bestowed upon 
83 Kirakos, the Armenians, Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 176. 
84 Ibid. 176. 
85 Juwayni, World Conqueror, 618-19. 
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[Rukn-ad-Din] ... After the consummation of his marriage he asked the King to send him 
to the Court of MengU Qaan [M5ngke Khan]. The King approved his request. .. ,,86 The 
vassal still had to pay respects to the Great Khan, despite being highly honored with a 
wife. 
In addition to traveling to the Great Khan to offer formal submission, those 
surrendering had to offer royal hostages; one can see this standard Mongolian practice 
through both Armenian and Persian examples. After battle between the Mongols and the 
Persian noble Rukn-ad-Din, he finally decided to submit: 
[Rukn-ad-Din] sent out his son, his only one, and another brother called 
Iran-Shah with a delegation of notables, officials, and leaders of his 
people; while on Sunday the 29th ofShavval [19th of November] he came 
in person before the World-King and had the good fortune of waiting upon 
him. He brought all of his family and dependents (muttasilan) out of 
Maimun-Diz and offered his treasures as a token of his allegiance.8? 
Another example comes from the voluntary submission of the Cilician Armenians; King 
Heturn I sent his brother 5mbat to Karakorum to offer formal submission. Even though 
5mbat was received graciously by M5ngke Khan, the Great Khan still demanded that the 
king himself come and visit him, which he did. 
86 Juwayni, World Conqueror, 723. 
87 Ibid. 717. 
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THE DIVINE MANDATE AND ITS IMPACT ON RELATIONS 
It is both pertinent and important to analyze the Mongols' idea of the Divine 
Mandate and how it shaped foreign relations. The Divine Mandate was the single most 
important factor in shaping the relations between the Mongols and the peoples they 
encountered, as it established framework that formed all relations. To understand this 
framework, one must first understand the Divine Mandate, which began with the birth 
story of the Mongols. Kirakos of Ganjak related this origin story as told to him: 
... [The Mongols'] king was related to God, God having taken the heavens 
as His share and given the earth to the Xayan, was not born of the seed of 
man, but a light came from the unseen and entered through the skylight of 
the house and said to his mother: 'Conceive and thou shalt give birth to a 
son [who shall be] emperor of the earth ... ' This was told us by Grigor the 
isxan [prince] ... who had heard it from a great man amongst the great 
commanders, whose name was rutun Nuin, one day when he was 
instructing young children.88 
The heavenly child was Temujin, who later acquired the honorific Chinggis Khan. It was 
his and his successors' destiny to rule over all of the peoples of the world. 
Some scholars debate over whether the Divine Mandate existed or not and 
whether Chinggis believed in it. David Morgan argues against the existence of the Divine 
Mandate during Chinggis's reign, but Reuven Amitai-Preiss argues that it was clear 
Chinggis's successors did believe in it: 
It might be mentioned that Temuchin's adoption of the title Chinggis 
Khan, which has been translated as 'Oceanic' or 'Universal Khan,' may be 
88 Kirakos, the Armenians, 203. 
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an indication that some fonn of this ideology was current in his lifetime. 
Be this as it may, it is important to note that the 'imperial idea' was later 
to find repeated expression in the context of the Mamluk-Ilkhanid war. As 
will be seen, this belief is found to varying degrees in the many missives 
sent to the Mamluk rulers from 1260 onward. [Reuven] would suggest that 
it was one of the reasons behind the ongoing war with the Mamluks ... 89 
This viewpoint seemed the most plausible based on the primary evidence. There were 
several examples of the Ilkhans using the Mongol origin story as ruling justification in 
their diplomatic letters to other peoples. According to Amitai-Preiss there was an 
example from the writings of Rashid aI-Din, who said that after the battle of Abulustayn 
in 1277: "Abaqa [Khan] wrote to [the Mamluk Sultan] Baybars, and inter alia declared 
that God had given the earth to Chinggis Khan and his descendants.,,9o 
There was also numismatic evidence that points to the Ilkhans' belief in the 
Divine Mandate concept. These statements of global imperial rule were stamped on coins 
manufactured in the Ilkhanate during several different reigns. On some of Abaqa Khan's 
coins (the second Ilkhan) one finds such titles as: 'lord of the world (padishah-i alam)' 
and 'ruler of the necks of the nations (malik riqab al-umam). ,91 
Additionally, it seemed that other peoples believed in some interpretation of the 
Divine Mandate, which can be seen in Annenian and Persian texts. It was believed that 
the Mongols had divine support and/or they were used as a punishment for sins. The 
Annenians certainly saw the Mongols as divine punishment as explained by Grigor: 
Thus was accomplished what God had threatened, speaking through his 
prophet. '[Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon] is a cup of gold in my hand, and 
to whomsoever I wish I shall give to drink of it.' Thus this wild <and 
bestial> folk not only once brought the cup, but also the dregs ofbittemess 
upon us, because of our many and varied sins, which continually roused 
the anger of the Creator our God at our deeds. Wherefore the Lord roused 
89 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 11. 
90 Rashid aI-Din, Successors, quoted in Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 231. 
91 Ibid. 231. 
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them in his anger as a lesson to us, because we had not kept his 
commandments. 92 
Grigor further related that: "The angel ... named their chi ef rayan, whom they 
called Cankez rayan [Chinggis Khan] or Cankez Xan. The angel bade them rule over 
many countries and districts, and to multiply without limit and in countless numbers, 
which also came to pass.,,93 If an angel from God had appeared to the Mongols as Grigor 
described, then the Armenians must have had some concept of the Divine Mandate and 
its requirement for the Mongols to rule the world. In addition to prophetic writings and 
stories, many different peoples (usually sedentary) believed in the Chinggisid claims to 
divine support because these claims were underscored by the speed and success of 
Mongol military campaigns. According to Anne Broadbridge, only a dynasty supported 
by God could conquer so much so fast. These divine concepts continued from Chinggis 
to his successor Ogedei and helped to inspire the conquests of the 1230s and 1240s.94 
Broadbridge's argument appeared to be the most plausible in helping to explain how 
sedentary peoples may have believed in divine support to the Mongols. 
The Divine Mandate shaped relations by establishing a rigid framework with the 
Mongols always being on top of the ruling hierarchy. Mongol decision-making was also 
shaped by the Divine Mandate; policies were geared toward military conquest. 95 
Therefore, any relationship could only be 'the conqueror and the conquered,' or as 
enemies. 
92 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 291. 
93 Ibid. 291. 
94 Anne Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 7. 
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This 'conqueror or conquered' mentality can be seen in the terminology used in 
the primary sources: 
Those who totally submitted were el (if), which literally meant 'to be at 
peace or in harmony,' but really connoted the state of unconditional 
loyalty to the Mongols. On the other hand, all those who resisted the 
Mongols and refused to submit were bulgha (literally 'to be in a confused 
or disordered state') or yaghi ('enemy'); both terms expressed the state of 
being 'unsubmitted' or 'rebellious' and thus being at war with the 
Mongols. There was no intermediate state and those who resisted were to 
be annihilated accordingly. 96 
Even some of the primary source authors thought in this binary fashion. Grigor explained 
the Mongol conquest of Armenia in these terms: "When this wild <and bestial> folk [the 
Mongols] learned that it was the will of God to rule ... upon the earth, thereupon they 
gathered their troops and attacked the Persians.'.97 
After their enemy submitted, the Mongols demanded benefits that propelled their 
conquests, such as the provisioning of its armies, the acquisition of more military forces, 
and the establishment of a loyal and stable government in the area. For a Mongol vassal, 
these conditions were non-negotiable: accept them or be killed. Even those standard 
benefits the Mongols offered to their new vassals had a military advantage built in for the 
Mongols. The Mongols primarily offered military protection to their new vassal and on 
the surface this would seem like a negative for the Mongols since it would pull Mongol 
forces away from future campaigns of conquest. But the Mongols needed to ensure the 
stability of their conquered regions so that they would remain under Mongol control and 
continue to supply the Ilkhan's armies with supplies and men. 
96 J.F. Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspective," HJAS 46 (1986): 19,30-5, cited in 
Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 9. 
97 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 291. 
35 
Further concessions, such as the exemption from taxation of the Armenian 
Church, also helped to reestablish stability in the area, as well as gaining local support 
from the Church. The return of lands to the Armenian nobles also engendered loyalty and 
stability. Local control also meant that local troops could be used as the bulk of defensive 
forces (although some Mongols remained as mentioned earlier). The Mongols could then 
send the majority of their warriors to the front. This was of especial importance during 
the Mamluk-Ilkhanid conflict, as the Mongol horse archer was the most effective weapon 
against the Mamluks' own horse archers and heavier cavalry. 
Clearly the Mongols shaped their policies and offered benefits according to their 
pursuit of the Divine Mandate and as such, the vast majority of benefits conferred upon 
their vassal would also benefit the Mongols. But how did the Divine Mandate shape and 
impact relations between the Mongols and the Mamluks? How could the Mongols enact a 
'conqueror's policy' when they had not yet conquered their enemy, the Mamluks? From 
the beginning of their relationship, the Mongols aggressively demanded the submission 
of the Mamluks. This stance is clearly represented in the diplomatic letters exchanged 
between multiple Ilkhans and the Sultans. In 1260, Hiilegii sent envoys to Egypt, bringing 
a letter demanding submission. The letter contained verses from the Koran and was 
couched in Islamic terms, but the message was clearly Mongol, submit or die and the 
Mongols possess the divinely given right to rule the world.98 
The Mongols continued to demand submission, even after their defeat at Ayn 
lalut, which they viewed as a temporary setback. According to Robert Irwin, Ayn lalut 
had no immediate and significant negative impact on the Mongols' war-making abilities; 
they were able to mount military campaigns in the following years: 1261, 1280, 1299, 
98 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 36. 
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1301, and 1303.99 Amitai-Preiss concurred that Ayn Jalut was only an 'interim victory' 
for the Mamluks. As he pointed out, the Mongol army defeated there was only a fraction 
of the Ilkhanate's total forces. 100 Based on this evidence, it is clear that Irwin's analysis is 
the most plausible concerning the impact of Ayn Jalut. 
Another aspect of the Divine Mandate impacted Mamluk-Ilkhanid relations much 
more than the demand for submission. The Divine Mandate inherently conveyed two 
important ideas: the first was that the Mongols were commanded by God (Tenggri) to 
conquer the world. If they pursued this policy, the Mongols were following the plan and 
will of God. Broadbridge's interpretation of the Divine Mandate stated that the Mongols 
were conquerors because God had commanded them to do so. Therefore, the Mongols, by 
their actions, were following the will of God. If anyone resisted the Mongols, they were 
also resisting God's will. As such, these resistors were unbelievers and must therefore be 
punished. Broadbridge's summation: In obedience to the will of the Enduring Sky 
(Tenggri), members of Ching gis's imperial or 'golden' family attempted to impose 
universal Chinggisid rule on the world through military campaigns. Any independent 
ruler intent on retaining his independence was a rebel against the golden family and the 
Enduring Sky. Merciless slaughter of such rebels was necessary and good, since it 
implemented divine will and provided an object lesson to other would-be rebels. 101 
The Mamluks were a shining example of being obstructors to the Mongol right to 
rule the world. After his conversion to Islam in 1295, the Ilkhan Ghazan (r. 1295 to 1304) 
sent a series ofletters to the Mamluk Sultan Nasir [aI-Din] Muhammad b. Qalawun 
(second reign 1299-1309) bragging about his own Islamic piety, but more importantly, 
99 Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 34. 
100 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 47. 
101 Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology, 6. 
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offering a more subtle demand for surrender. According to Thomas Raff, Ghazan 
considered his letter a warning to the Mamluks to surrender and his messengers were the 
harbingers of this warning. 102 Furthermore, Ghazan displayed his commitment to the 
belief that the Mongols held God's favor and were doing God's will when he, according 
to Raff, accused the Sultan Qalawun of" 'persistence in aberration' as well as obstinacy 
to God and obstinacy to us [Mongols];' Nasir ad-Din's [Qalawun's] soldiers 'wage war 
against God,' they' give open battle to God by acts of rebellion.' He therefore advises the 
Mamluks to 'put the affair in (the correct!) order. ",103 When Ghazan referred to the 
correct order, he was referring to the correct world order in which the Mongols ruled the 
world and the Mamluks were in their rightful lowly place as slaves. The Mamluks were 
going against God and were considered rebels because they were interfering with God's 
plan to see the Mongols as the rightful rulers of the world. Clearly, Ghazan still believed 
and utilized all of the major aspects of the Divine Mandate, especially in his dealings 
with the Mamluks. 
The second important concept that arose from the Divine Mandate was that a 
hierarchical structure existed in the world. It can also be interpreted that God established 
this hierarchical order since He sought to make the Mongols the rulers of the world. This 
sense of hierarchy was also present in the Mongols' nomadic societal structure, thus it 
was a concept familiar to them (as it was to most peoples during this time). The policies 
pursued by Chinggis Khan clearly showed the Mongols' adherence to a hierarchical 
system. During his conquests to unify the nomadic tribes, Chinggis instituted a policy in 
which defeated nomads and other Mongols were enslaved and incorporated into a 
102 Thomas Raff, Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwa by Ibn Taimiya (Leiden, 1973), 35. 
103 Ibid. 35. 
38 
hereditary system of slavery (Otegii boghul). The system was meant to destroy any tribal 
power and connections left after his conquests, as well humiliating the defeated tribes. 104 
This tactic was especially effective in nomadic societies because to the Mongols slavery 
was the condition of lesser peoples. 
The Mamluks insulted and stood in the face of these two principles. The 
Mamluks, both in definition and practice, were a slave caste, the lowest of the low on the 
social hierarchy. Yet, there they stood acting in positions of authority, fighting on the 
battlefield in elite units, and even ruling as sultan! These facts alone were insults to the 
Mongols (and Armenians) as it went against everything they believed in and lived by. !Os 
But just as importantly, the Mamluks had the audacity to openly and vehemently resist 
the Mongols. Now they were seen as rebels and unbelievers who could not accept God's 
will that they submit and be ruled by the Mongols. The Mamluks' continued resistance 
and victories were slowly working to prove the Divine Mandate wrong. This was surely 
even greater motivation for the Mongols to defeat the Mamluks. 
104 Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology, l3. 
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THE MONGOLS AND ARMENIANS 
This section will examine the primary evidence (available in English translation) 
relating to the interactions and links between the Ilkhanid Mongols and the kingdom of 
Cilician Armenia and Greater Armenia. In the instances where the word' Armenians' is 
used, this is referring to all Armenians, both those from Cilicia and those from Greater 
Armenia. Distinctions will be made between the two groups when appropriate. This 
section will ultimately argue that based on the analysis of primary and secondary 
literature, the negative consequences of the Mongol-Armenian alliance greatly 
overshadowed the benefits, ultimately stating that the Armenians' alliance with the 
Ilkhanid Mongols was primarily detrimental to the Armenians. This conclusion flies in 
the face of the standard expectation that an alliance would prove mainly beneficial for the 
parties involved. This type of expectation certainly can apply to an alliance with the 
Mongols, who at the beginning of the period under study, were the most successful and 
powerful force in Asia and were poised for further triumphant conquests. 
This section will begin with a summary of the submissions of the Armenians and 
an explanation of their specific terms of surrender, their status as a subject or vassal state, 
and the benefits a vassal could receive from the Mongols. Next, there will be an analysis 
of the actual benefits the Armenians received, both those they actively pursued and those 
conferred by the terms of submission. The focus will then shift to analyzing the negative 
effects the Armenians experienced from their Mongol alliance. These negative effects are 
40 
divided into subtopics: first, those negative effects that occurred because of a failure on 
the Mongols' part; second, those negative effects that resulted from the Armenians 
seeking to fulfill Mongol demands; and third, those negative effects that resulted from the 
Armenians not fulfilling their obligations to the Mongols. 
By the mid-thirteenth century the Mongols looked like an invincible military 
machine and many in their path submitted to their superior force. Such a relationship 
could have benefits for the vassal. After the initial shock of submission, the Armenians 
began to hope they would earn significant benefits from their relationship with the 
Mongols. For the Cilician Armenians, the very real threat of the Mongols was enough to 
procure their submission. Submission was seen as a wiser decision, in that the Mongols 
would hopefully not invade Cilician Armenia and devastate the country. Hetum I's 
submission had the immediate desired effect; the country was spared. But it is unclear 
whether Hetum really knew all of the obligations required of a Mongol vassal. If he had, 
would he have still chosen submission? Presumably, he would have still surrendered 
because the destruction of Cilician Armenia was a much more immediate and measurable 
consequence than the more attrition-like loss of men and resources required by the 
Mongols. Submission was also the best course because the Mongols were the most 
powerful and immediate threat to the Cilician Armenians at that time. The Cilician 
Armenians' neighbor, the Sultanate of Rum, had just fallen to the Mongols and the 
Cilician Armenians had not yet directly encountered the other powerful regional player, 
the Egyptian Mamluks. 
The circumstances around the surrender of the princes of Greater Armenia were 
quite different. In this case, the nobles resisted the Mongols, but failed. Hence, this 
41 
established a true 'conqueror, conquered' relationship. The Greater Armenian princes 
surrendered individually in order to preserve what little they had left. Some of the 
benefits of surrender were clearer immediately to the Greater Armenian princes because 
it was conveyed to them that if they surrendered the Mongols would return their lands to 
them. One such example was the Armenian Prince Vahram of Gag; when he learned of 
the possibility for clemency, he commanded the city of Samkor, which belonged to him, 
to surrender to the Mongols. In fact, he forbade the city to resist at all.I06 
It was clear that both the Cilician Armenians and the Greater Armenian princes 
had little choice in surrendering, but why did the Armenians choose to stay allied with the 
Mongols? Presumably, the Mongols were seen as a safer political bet than, say, the 
Mamluks. During this time, the Mongols looked as though they would continue their 
conquests; they certainly had proven their prowess by conquering Armenia, and the 
Armenians had certainly heard of the Mongols' other conquests. Some of the Armenians' 
decisions in staying allied with the Mongols can be partially explained by utilizing a 
phrase called 'Mongol Prestige,' which was coined by Marshall Hodgson.! 07 He 
developed this phrase as one way of explaining the impact of Mongol ideology on the 
outside world. 'Mongol Prestige' was when non-Mongol peoples expressed awe and 
respect for Mongol military might. This awe then influenced the political actions of these 
non-Mongol peoples because they would make appeals to the greatness of Mongol 
military might. J08 Taking 'Mongol Prestige' into account, the most plausible reason the 
Armenians stayed allied with the Mongols was largely because of the Mongols' military 
106 Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 172-173. 
107 For Marshall Hodgson's argument in full, see Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology, 9. 
108 Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology, 9. 
42 
strength. The Armenians thought they would be protected while avoiding further Mongol 
devastation. 
Secondly, the Mongols were the most immediate threat to the Armenians, so in 
order to preserve themselves, the Armenians needed to submit to the Mongols. There 
were no strong peoples around them to help them ward off the Mongols; no other country 
could really help them, especially as the Armenians helped the Mongols subdue their 
neighbors, i.e. Rum. Also, once the Armenians began to help the Mongols in their 
military campaigns in the surrounding area, they were seen as enemies by the 
neighboring peoples, thus burning any future possibilities for 10caVregional alliances. 
Thirdly, Armenian religious thought played a role in continuing the Mongol 
alliance. The Armenians believed that it was God's will that the Armenians should be 
conquered by the Mongols and that the Mongols were militarily successful because they 
had God's favor. The Mongols' victories confIrmed to the Armenians that God supported 
the Mongols, thus the Armenians should support God's Chosen. This belief became 
prominent in the Armenian literature of the period and was used to explain Mongol 
success and the beginning of the Armenian-Mongol alliance. Whether the viewpoint of 
these Armenian authors truly represented the belief of their people is unclear. It was 
possible that the Armenian authors used such rationale as a coping mechanism in dealing 
with the Mongol conquest of their country; as a way of understanding why such a 
catastrophic event would happen, or why God would allow such an event to happen. It is 
unclear if this was the case, but certainly is a viable reaction to trauma. 
Either way, the Armenians showed their 'support' for the Mongols and believed 
they were their best bet by expressing and exalting divine favor. Grigor of Akner 
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described the development of this belief in the Mongols' divine support: " ... when the 
wise princes of Armenia and Georgia realized that God had given power and victory to 
[the Mongols] to take our lands, they then became reconciled, and became obedient to the 
Tatars ... "I09 The Mongols' military successes convinced the Armenians that God favored 
the Mongols, therefore the Armenians believed that the Mongols were the strongest 
power in the area. The Armenians also believed they could count on their protection. 
Very few people could have imagined the Mongols' defeat at Ayn Jalut at the hands of 
the Mamluks only a few years later. Even when seen as a punishment for their sins, it was 
still the safe bet to side with those chosen by God to act as his vessel, those God showed 
favor to. 
Another form of protection the Mongols offered was their showing of support for 
one particular ruler in any given area. Earning the Mongols' support meant that a ruler 
secured his throne and had a ready made security force in times of rebellion against his 
rule. The Mongols' chosen ruler showed his loyalty to the Mongols by abiding by the 
terms of submission, but also by portraying himself as a conservative protector of 
Chinggisid heritage through marrying a Chinggisid princess, ruling in the name of the 
Chinggisids, and swearing to uphold the Yasa (the legal code of the Mongols set forth by 
Chinggis Khan).IIO 
Even some Persians believed in Mongol superiority and assumed the Mongols 
would continue to be victorious. According to Juwayni: 
The truth of God's secret intent by the rise ofChingiz-Khan has become 
clear and the benefit afforded by the passing of dominion and sovereignty 
to the World-Emperor Mengti Qa'an [Mongke Khan] plain to see. By this 
famous victory the keys of the lands of the world are placed ready for use 
109 Grigor, Nation of Archers, quoted in Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 177. 
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in the hands of the [Mongols'] power, and the bolts of the remaining 
countries of the climes ... are now undone. III 
Benefits of Mongol Allegiance 
First and foremost, the Mongols offered military protection for their vassals. It 
was within Mongol interests to protect those who they had recently conquered. These 
conquered peoples would no longer have the capacity to defend themselves as the 
Mongols would have destroyed any immediate military threats. One such example can be 
gleaned from the Mongols' treatment of the Greater Armenian princes. The Mongols 
demanded that the princes destroy their mountain strongholds and then left Mongol 
troops in place to protect these areas while further Mongol forces were called upon to 
subjugate the area. According to Grigor of Akner, after the Armenian and Georgian 
princes surrendered to the Mongols, the Mongols ceased their destructive campaign "but 
they left a captain, rara Buya (Qara Buqa) by name, to demolish all of the strongholds 
which had been conquered. They destroyed even to the foundations the impregnable forts 
built by the Arabs at a great cost. This all came to pass.,,112 It was also important for the 
Mongols to protect the numerous assets their conquered regions provided. This need for 
immediate security can be seen in the case of Rukn ad-Din, who submitted to Hiilegii 
during the I11illan's initial reconquest of Persia. Once Rukn ad-Din submitted, all of his 
possessions were placed under Mongol control; his army was divided up among Hulegii's 
emirs and he had to accompany the I1lillan to the royal ordu in Hamadan. Hiilegii sent 
elchis to fetch the remaining enemy commanders, while his Mongol forces assessed the 
treasuries in the captured castles, and guarded the enemy castles until larger Mongol 
III Juwayni, World Conqueror, 638. 
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forces could arrive. I 13 This proposal for immediate security in the aftermath of Mongol 
conquest surely seemed enticing to those who wished for the violence to end and to save 
what little they had left. 
As a result of their administrative outlook, which placed primary emphasis on 
proper, loyal service above all else, the Mongols maintained an empire of religious 
tolerance. This was certainly seen as a benefit to the conquered peoples who were 
relieved that they could contiue their native religions. Within the Ilkhanate's 
administration, positions of power were held by Christians, Muslims, Jews, and pagans. 
Some of the most prominent contemporary scholars found patronage at the court of the 
Ilkhanate, including many authors whose works have survived to inform historians on 
this period. One such example was the Muslim writer Nasir aI-Din Tusi, who "was 
quickly pardoned and honored despite his history with the hated Ismailis ... Tusi was 
almost immediately installed in a place of honour and power in Hiilegu's court ... One 
of. .. [Tusi' s] first tasks was the establishment of his seat of learning in Maragheh 
containing his famous library and observatory, a centre for an international cast of 
academics, clerics and scholars ... ,,114 Bar Hebraeus also found sanctuary in Maragheh 
and utilized its great places of learning. I IS 
Hiilegii was keen to utilize all of the local talent he could in the running of his 
new empire. The biographer of Ghazan Khan, Rashid aI-Din, related the treatment of his 
own relatives, who had honorably served the previous Persian regime. According to 
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George Lane, Rashid al-Din's "own relatives were recognized for their own abilities and 
were given refuge after the fall of Alamut.,,116 In addition: 
The thinker and Shia divine, Ibn Tawus, together with other clerics and 
scholars were all spared the massacres of Baghdad and like the Caucasus's 
leading clerics and academics, were soon co-opted into Htilegii's circle of 
apparent admirers .... Rashid aI-Din readily acknowledges Hulegii's keen 
interest in science and the disputations and discussions of philosophers 
and scholars and his generous allocation of pensions and stipends to these 
learned 'hangers' on.'1l7 
Therefore, Hiilegu and his successors were more concerned with utilizing the resources at 
hand than instituting religious or political persecution. 
Service to the Mongols could also provide great political benefits to their vassals. 
The Mongols conferred political power to their most valued vassals by favoring certain 
houses over others, either through the granting of positions or the redistribution of lands 
from less favored vassals to the valued. In the case of Greater Armenia, political power 
granted from the Mongols allowed certain Armenian houses to capitalize on their 
positions, even after the fall of the Ilkhanate. Such an example was Prosh Khaghbakian, 
who strengthened the position of his house (later known as the Proshians) through his 
loyalty and service. I 18 
A very valuable incentive for the Mongols' vassals was the possibility of having 
their lands returned to them (perhaps with some additional land). The treatment of the 
Greater Armenian princes gave several such examples. According to Vardan Arewelci: 
"Vahram with his son Albulay fled from place to place, until he realized that they spared 
116 Ibid. 
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those who submitted and willingly capitulated. Then he came and received the castles and 
the province taken from them which had been [Vahram's] own patrimonial property." I 19 
Bedrosian quoted Kirakos as giving the following information on Prince Awag's 
surrender to Chormaghan, the Mongol general for Armenian lands: 
[Chormaghan] further ordered all of his troops not to fight with the 
fortresses and cities under Awag's domination. And great ease came about 
in his [Awag] land and many captives among the azats were freed because 
of him. And [Chormaghan] gave him all of his land and more besides and 
established unbreakable friendship with him. Taking Awag and all his 
troops, [Chormaghan] marched against the city of Ani. 120 
In most instances, when a prince surrendered, the Mongol commander ordered the 
destruction of all the prince's lands to cease immediately, thus sparing him further 
damage (a great benefit in itself). One can see the immediate operation of the Mongol 
terms of submission in Kirakos' description; Awag received his lands back and in return 
went on campaign with Chormaghan immediately against Ani. 
Certainly the most important benefit the Mongols conferred to their vassals was 
the extension of a pardon for all the past transgressions the vassals had committed against 
the Mongols. These transgressions could be direct military opposition, simply being on 
the losing side, or not following Mongol demands. Kirakos again described the process of 
Prince Awag's submission. After his initial submission, Awag then visited the Khan in 
Karakorum. Many other Armenian princes were at court offering submission as well. 
These men included " ... Sahnsah, son of Zakare; prince Vahram and his son Albula; 
Hasan called Jalal, prince of the Xacen area, and many others. The Tatars gave to each 
one control over his lands and for the time being, a pardon.,,121 A pardon given by the 
119 Vardan, Compilation, 214. 
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Khan meant that the Mongols would cease military operations against the new vassal and 
he would not longer be considered an enemy of the Mongols. 
Of great importance to warrior aristocracies was the opportunity to gain and prove 
martial prowess. They did this both to secure the loyalty of their own people and earn the 
respect of their enemies and possible allies. The Annenians were such warriors and "the 
Caucasian Christians and the Annenians of Lesser Annenia [Cilician Annenia] willingly 
swelled the ranks of the conquering [Ilkhanid] army and were energetic in proving 
themselves brave and worthy allies.,,122 According to Bedrosian, Grigor of Akner stated: 
"Htilegii Khan greatly loved the Annenian and Georgian forces because of the extreme 
bravery which they displayed before him in all battles. Therefore he called them bahaturs 
[heroes, champions]. He selected the young and handsome sons of the great princes of 
Annenia and Georgia and appointed them as his guards.,,123 
Although the Greater Annenian submissions were for the most part forced by 
violence or the threat of violence, the Annenian princes quickly looked for what benefits 
they could glean from this subservient status to the Mongols. The princes' main aim was 
to increase their political power at the expense of other princes. This political rivalry 
allowed the Mongols easily to keep the Annenians and Georgian families divided. 124 It 
was Mongol policy that before conquering a particular area, the area was always divided 
up to be taken by lots among their generals. The surrendered naxarars then became 
clients of the particular Mongol general conquering that territory. This standard Mongol 
policy worked well in creating and perpetuating divisions among the Annenian nobility. 
An example of the Mongol policy of pitting Annenian political ambitions against one 
122 Lane, Persian Renaissance, 258. 
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another was in the 1260s and 1270s, when the Mongols furthered the territorial and 
political ambitions of the Orbelians and the ArcrunidIMahkanaberdelis at the expense of 
the Zakarids and the Georgian Bagratids. 125 Obviously, the ArcrunidIMahkanaberdelis 
families benefited from their Mongol alliance (but such Mongol favor vacillated). 
Another way in which some Annenians benefited from their Mongol alliance was 
through the conquest of other Annenians. Beside the Mongols they attacked Annenian 
cities that had not surrendered. They received plunder and possibly land. One such 
example came from the Mongol conquests in the 1230s and 1240s. It is pertinent because 
the Mongols pursued very similar policies in the 1250s and the Annenian princes acted in 
a similar fashion: 
Then the great and independent princes of Georgia ... became tributary to 
them, willingly or unwillingly. They gave freely all of the tribute 
demanded ... They themselves, according to their resources and ability, 
came with their cavalry with them (the Tatars) on raids, and took the 
unconquered towns and castles, plundering and taking captives. They 
killed without mercy men and women, priests and monks, making slaves, 
taking the deacons as their slaves, and plundering the churches of the 
Christians without fear .... 126 
This type of military assistance also extended to wars beyond the Annenian border. 
Grigor of Akner stated that a "mustering of the people of the archers with the Annenian 
and Georgian princes [occurred], and they attacked the country of Rum with a countless 
multitude.,,127 
In reaction to the Annenian princes' efforts toward political gains, the Mongols 
bestowed several different benefits. These measures began after 1256, the year HUlegii 
founded the Ilkhanate. The Mongols attempted to incorporate certain prominent naxarars 
125 Ibid. 183. 
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into their own court and administration. They further bound the naxarars through 
marriage, giving each a Mongol wife. They also granted certain Armenian territories inju 
status, i.e. independent authority on one's own land. This new status broke the princes 
away from the Georgian crown to the benefit of the Mongols and the Armenian princes, 
who had chomped at the bit to free themselves from the Georgian regime. 5mbat 
Orbelian received inju status in 1252; Hasan Jalal received it in 1257; and Sarqis Jaqeli in 
1273.128 Some Cilician Armenian nobles were treated in a similar fashion. Mongke Khan 
made "him [Smbat Sparapet] a vassal and gave him a great iariax, a golden tablet, and a 
real Tatar queen with a crown, which for them was a great honor. To whomsoever they 
honor and esteem they give a wife from their women of station. Thus they were giving 
great honor to the Armenian general.,,129 According to Vardan Arewelci, Hiilegii further 
trusted the Armenians by using Armenian merchants as emissaries. 130 
The princes of Greater Armenia and the king of Cilician Armenia both sought 
territorial gains, a chief desire of all rulers. According to Dashdondog, the Armenian 
chronicler Heturn Patmich described the following event. After the capture of Syria and 
Palestine in 1260, the Mongols gave King Hetum I ofCilician Armenia territory in 
western Cilicia along with several fortresses that had been taken by the Muslims. King 
Heturn I also expanded his territories on the Cappadocian, Mesopotamian, and Syrian 
borders where the trade routes passed and his son-in-law Bohemond VI of Antioch 
received the port of Latakia. 131 Grigor explained that: "[Hiilegu] began to rebuild the 
devastated places, and from each inhabited village he selected householders, one from the 
128 Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions. 184-185. 
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small, and two or three from the large villages, and he called them iam, and sent them to 
all of the destroyed places to undertake rebuilding. They paid no taxes at all, but gave 
only bread and broth for Tatar travelers. He established by such ordinances the throne of 
his Khanate ... ,,132 
Just as common as desire for land, the Armenians also sought material wealth 
from gaining economic routes and booty from military campaigns. The Armenian 
naxarars and common soldiers received booty from their Mongol campaigns. This was a 
large benefit for the Armenians in their alliance with the Mongols. They were especially 
enriched after the sacking of the Sultanate of Rum and when Awag helped sack Ani he 
looted its churches. 133 Bedrosian supplied a passage from the Georgian chronicle the 
History of Kartli: "The Georgians and Tatars swelled up with all sorts of treasures: gold 
and silver, gold and silver cups and bowls, extraordinary cloths and clothing and so many 
horses, asses and camels that it is impossible to count them.,,134 The Armenians also 
gained many religious treasures, including the right hand of Saint Bartholomew. After a 
siege of three years the Mongols "took the City of Martyrs [Mayyafariqin], where the 
Armenian forces which were with the Tatars found many relics of the saints and brought 
them to their country.,,135 
Christianity played an important role in shaping Armenian-Mongol relations, both 
in actual events and how they interpreted later. The Armenians wanted a strong ally in 
protecting and promoting Christianity and it seems that they measured a ruler's value on 
his support of their faith: 
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Since they [Hetum and his advisors] had first seen Bacu, the commander 
of the Tatar army, and had confirmed a pact of friendship and submission, 
then after this they sent the brother of the King, the general of Armenia, 
Baron 5mbat to Sayin ran [Monkge Khan], who had been set on the 
throne ofCankez ran [Chinggis Khan]. He went with the blessing of God 
and saw Sayin ran, who was very pro-Christian and virtue-loving. 
Because of this his people called him Sayin ran, which in their language 
means the good and fine ran.136 
A showing of support for Christianity certainly also helped in their negotiations, although 
in this quote Grigor flipped the situation by the Khan showing gratitude for the 
Armenians being Christian. "On seeing the Armenian general [Smbat], Sayin ran 
[Mongke Khan] rejoiced much because of the Christian faith but even more because of 
the firm, manly, and wise words which ... Smbat spoke before him.,,137 
The Armenians needed to see that their military allies supported the Christian 
faith. Grigor of Akner praised Hiilegli numerous times in his support of Christianity. 
Grigor and Vardan both related: "Hulawu Khan was very good, loving Christians, the 
church, and priests. Likewise his blessed wife Tawvus Xatun, who was good in every 
way, and was compassionate to the poor and needy. She very much loved all Christians, 
Armenians and Syrians, so that her tent was a church, and a sounder traveled with her, 
and many Armenian and Syrian priests.,,138 Grigor went further in his description: 
"Hulawu ran [Hiilegli Khan] himself was a great mind and great soul, just, and quite 
learned. He was a great shedder of blood, but he slew only the wicked and his enemies, 
and not the good or righteous. He loved the Christian folk more than the infidels.,,139 
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Grigor of Akner described a gathering between Hetum I and his princes, priests, 
and nobles in which Heturn praised the service of his son Toros, who was killed in battle 
against the Mamluks. Heturn also mentioned the service of horsemen, which most likely 
referred to the Mongols: "Just as such a number of horsemen strove on behalf of the 
Christians, and became worthy of heavenly crowns, so also did my sons. Toros strove 
valiantly for the Christians and contended for the Christians.,,14o 
Heturn I, king of Cilician Armenia, demanded that the Mongols restore the Holy 
Land to Christian hands. According to Heturn Patmich, Heturn I expressed his desire both 
to Mongke Khan at Karakorum in 1253/54 and then to Hiilegii at Maragheh in 1258.141 
Hetum I and his successors also made appeals to the Christian West to help liberate the 
Holy Land. The Armenians hoped that the Western powers "would join forces with 
[Armenia's] powerful and some time Christian Tatar [Mongol] overlords and assist in 
their delivery of the 'Holy Land' to their righteous [Armenian] safe keeping. They alone 
among these thirteenth-century would-be allies appeared to whole-heartedly endorse the 
concept of an all out united war to rid Syria and Egypt of the infidel Muslims.,,142 
The Armenians sought to improve the standing of their Christian Church by 
appealing to the Ilkhans, asking for the churches to be exempt from Mongol taxes. 
According to Grigor of Akner, the Cilician Armenians received such benefits. After the 
return of 5mbat from Karakorum, the Mongols ordered Heturn to go and see Mongke 
Khan: "The pious King Hetum, seeing his brother Baron 5mbat thus favored with such an 
honor, and esteemed by the Khan, rejoiced greatly. He rejoiced even more because of the 
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documents regarding the freeing from taxes of our land and our monasteries, and of all 
Christians.,,143 
According to the Armenian chronicler Kirakos, King Hetum I drafted a list of 
appeals, which he presented to the Great Khan, upon offering his submission. In this list 
Hetum I asked for the Great Khan to convert to Christianity and be baptized, as well as 
allow the establishment of Christian churches in all Mongol lands and that the Armenians 
be freed from all taxes. He also demanded that Mongke Khan free the Holy Land from 
the Mamluks and give the Christians jurisdiction there. Other requests of a less religious 
nature included that the Mongols suppress the Caliph of Baghdad, that the Mongols offer 
the Armenians help in times of need, and that all lands of the Armenians taken by the 
Mamluks be given back to the Armenians. 144 
Hetum also asked for the Armenian Church to receive exemptions from taxes. 
According to Grigor, Hetum was successful in his petitioning and described his trip in 
this manner: 
The pious King of the Armenians, Hetum, heard that Hulawu fan [HUlegU 
Khan] had been enthroned, and that he was so friendly and pro-Christian; 
then the Armenian King himself also went to the east with many gifts. He 
saw Hulawu fan, and when the Khan saw the King of Armenia he liked 
him very much and honored him. He wrote a second charter (lit., freedom) 
for his kingdom, but more especially for the churches and ecclesiastics, 
and for all the Christians of the country. With such honor and great wealth 
he dispatched the King of the Armenians to his country.145 
In Greater Armenia, some areas were more successful in gaining exemptions from 
taxes. The historic records show that these exemptions were given to selective churches 
and princes and the exemptions themselves were not uniform. In 1287, the Ilkhan Arghun 
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(r. 1284-1291) made a decree that eliminated 150 Armenian monasteries and convents 
from the royal tax registry. This decree was in actuality a confirmation of an earlier 
decree in which Tarsaich Orbelian succeeded in securing these tax exemptions. 146 
In his list of petitions, Hetum also asked the Ilkhan to spare the Christian 
communities in all of the conquered cities. When Baghdad was captured, the Christians 
who lived there were spared by the invading Mongols, apparently by the goodwill and 
intervention ofHUlegii's Christian wife, Toluz Khatun. According to Vardan: "Hulawu 
[Htilegii] went to the land of Mesopotamia and captured those cities and provinces ... the 
patriarch of Armenia, the Catholicos, came to him, blessed him and was befriended by 
him. When he took all the country of Sam [Syria], there was also with him our crowned 
[King] Hetum who freed from death the Christians, ecclesiastics and laymen, in every 
place ... ,,147 It was clear in both the Armenian and Arabic sources that the Mongols 
attempted such a policy, but it was not uniformly enforced and it experienced mixed 
success. 
Harmful Effects of Mongol Allegiance 
Unfortunately for the Armenians, there were numerous risks in their Ilkhanid 
alliance, many of which did not transform into benefits. These losses naturally reflected 
negatively on the Armenian-Ilkhanid alliance and served as a means in determining 
whether the Ilkhanid alliance was ultimately beneficial or not for the Armenians, both in 
Cilicia and Greater Armenia. For the Kingdom ofCilician Armenia, the most significant 
negative impact that resulted from their Ilkhanid alliance was that the alliance brought 
them into direct contact with the Egyptian Mamluks, who quickly became a fierce 
146 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 181. 
147 Vardan, Compilation, 217-18. 
56 
enemy. In fact, it would be the Mamluks who would ultimately destroy the Kingdom of 
Cilician Annenia in 1375 (the Ilkhanate had already collapsed in 1335). The Mamluks 
attacked the Annenians during lags in their conflicts with the Ilkhanid Mongols and 
Crusaders; they often attacked in retribution for the Armenian raids into northern Syria, 
land the Mamluks considered theirs. 
The military threat of the Mamluks would not have been a problem if the Cilician 
Annenians had the consistent and strong military support of their Ilkhanid ally. 
Unfortunately this was not the case. The Ilkhanid Mongols were usually so engrossed 
with wars against the other branches of the Chinggisid family that they could not come to 
the aid of the Armenians. The Armenians and Georgians were in dire need of military 
assistance and protection against the Mongol rebel Teguder, who had challenged the 
ascension of Abaqa to the throne of the Ilkhanate and was ravaging the Annenian 
countryside and "the exactions of this lawless chieftain [Teguder] weighed upon the 
eastern monasteries. Learning of this the Annenian and Georgian princes went together 
to Abaya ran [Abaqa Khan] and cast their swords before the Khan and said 'Either give 
Tagudar [Teguder] and his troops into our hands, or kill us in front of you, so as not to 
see such outrages as they are doing to our churches and to the clergy. ",148 
Not only was it impossible for the Mongols to send aid to the Annenians against 
their enemies, it seemed impossible for the Mongols to defeat Teguder without the 
Armenians' aid (or at least this is how Grigor painted the picture). The Armenians and 
Georgians were continually pulled into these civil wars and forced to fight for the Ilkhan: 
He [Abaqa] gave the [Great] Khan's own seal into the hands ofSiramun 
[Mongol commander]. Likewise he ordered the Annenian and Georgian 
148 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 375-77. 
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forces to go themselves in full strength against Tagudar [Teguder], and 
mercilessly to slay his forces ... take all of his things, and to bring Tagudar 
himself alive before him [Abaqa]. Hearing this the Armenian and 
Georgian troops were very happy at the freeing of their land from the evil 
deeds of Tagudar. They bravely mustered themselves for war, likewise 
Siramun, the son ofCawrmayan [Chormaghan], who was very well 
disposed towards the Christians. Taking the Khan's standard and one 
hundred thousand troops, he suddenly fell on Tagudar and mercilessly 
slaughtered his troops. They took all of his treasure, and himself with 
seven hundred men whom they brought to the Khan. 149 
This particular piece of evidence also showed that the Mongols were able to eventually 
give their military protection to the Armenians against the Mongol rebel Teguder. 
Despite this example, overall it seemed that the Armenians came to the aid of the 
Mongols much more than the Mongols aided them. 
The greatest example of this lack of support and its dire consequences came when 
King Hetum I conducted raids into northern Syria, taking booty from the areas around 
Aleppo in 1262. He conducted several more raids from 1262-64, but all were 
unsuccessful. 150 He assumed he would receive Mongol support and protection and 
therefore need not worry about Mamluk retribution. But when the Mamluks came to 
address this grievance, the Mongols were not there to protect Hetum I and his kingdom 
suffered greatly for it. As the thirteenth century progressed, the Mamluks grew stronger 
and "in the last decade of the thirteenth century, their attacks intensified. In 1291, with 
the fall of Acre and Tyre, the Crusaders' power in Syria-Palestine was destroyed forever, 
leaving Armenia, under King Hethum II, as the last Christian bastion on the Asiatic 
mainland, supporting and supported by CypruS.,,151 
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Grigor stated that Hetum I refused to cooperate with the Mamluks because he 
believed he had the support of his nobles. He never mentioned the Mongols or the 
expectation of their support: 
Then the infidel and ferocious Sultan of Egypt came with a great force to 
Damascus, and from there sent ambassadors to the King of the Armenians 
in regard to some trifle which he wanted from the King. The Armenian 
King did not give it; rather he answered insulting words calling him a 
<dog> and a slave ... He did not make peace, but remained hostile to him 
and insubordinate, knowing that his father the Baron was alive and his 
princes united. 152 
It must be noted that Grigor seemed to contradict himself here in his description of the 
Armenians' loyalties to Hetum 1's policies. In the above quote, he stated that the princes 
were united with Hetum and that he could expect their military support. But then later in 
his work, Grigor blamed the Armenian defeat at the hands of the Mamluks on the 
Armenian army's rebelliousness, which led to the Prince Toros's death and the capture of 
Prince Lewon. 
Which story to believe was less important than what the quotation below can 
convey about Mongol-Armenian relations: 
Then the Armenian King, when he learned of the invasion of the Turks 
[Mamluks] into his country, mustered his forces and entrusted them to his 
sons, the crown princes, Lewon and Toros. He himself with his small 
detachment went to the Tatars [Mongols] who were sojourning between 
Ablstin and Kokeson. He remained there several days, not knowing ofthe 
dissensions in his army. Once he persuaded the chieftain of the Tatars to 
come and aid his troops, he came back two days ahead of them. Then he 
heard of the coming of the Turks and the defeat of his rebellious army, 
how they betrayed his sons, the crown princes, into the hands of the infidel 
wolves, and they themselves fled to their strongholds; that they (the Turks) 
[Mamluks] had struck down his handsomest son the prince, Baron Toros, 
from his horse in the battle. The Turks [Mamluks] had seized Baron 
Lewon and many of his troops, taking them prisoners to Egypt. 153 
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In the description above, the Mongols were persuaded to come to the aid of the 
Armenians, but arrived too late. This attempt at least showed that the Mongols did offer 
military aid to the Armenians, but to what extent and to what result cannot be known 
from this evidence. 
The Armenians' political reliance on the Mongols went against Armenian 
interests in the vast majority of cases. One such example of the political reliance of the 
Armenians on the Mongols was when Lewon, son of Return I, uncovered and dealt with a 
rebellion against his accession to the Armenian throne. Grigor explained that the 
Mongols allowed Lewon to imprison some of the rebels and kill others, while still "others 
[Lewon] dispatched to Abaya ran [Abaqa Khan] in the east. There they imposed the 
yasax [yasa] on them, and all other enemies they (the Mongols) gave into his hands, and 
they ordered him either to imprison them or to kill them.,,154 Clearly political 
subservience to the Mongols required that the Mongol law code, the yasa, took 
precedence over any Armenian law code. 
Another negative result of the Armenians' political links with the Mongols was 
that the Mamluks often attacked the Mongols indirectly by attacking the Armenians. 
Obviously, this tactic would have only hurt the Armenians. One such example was when 
the Ilkhan Arghun sought to steal the Egyptians' profitable trade routes in the Red Sea by 
constructing a naval fleet in Baghdad for this expressed purpose. In revenge, the Sultan 
Qalawun raided and pillaged the Cilician Armenians in 1285.155 
The Ilkhanate's internal politics regularly went against Armenian interests. But it 
was also the case that the Armenians' enemies attempted to use the Mongol political 
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system to attack the Armenians. There were multiple attempts to sow distrust in the 
Ilkhan's court against the Armenians. These dissenters had a strong grasp of the 
Mongols' laws and sought to use the Mongols' harsh rules against the Armenians. 
According to Grigor of Akner, some Armenian princes resided at the court of Abaqa 
Khan and fed information back to King Hetum I on the court's politics. These princes 
secretly sent back word that: 
Arab amirs had become advisers and associates of the Khan. In secret they 
were friendly to the Egyptians and evilly disposed to the king of the 
Armenians and to all Christians. The Arab amirs had become favorites and 
<advisers> of the Khan, and had written to the Sultan of Egypt in secret: 
'Seek by goodwill to obtain one village from the Armenian King, and this 
will be sufficient and more than enough to ruin him and his country. We 
will tell and advise the Khan that the Armenian King is damaging the 
whole world, and he will send horsemen to slay them all. ,156 
The Mongols had conquered most of the lands the Armenian king now administered and 
as such, the Armenian king was not allowed to give away land that was not his. Ifhe did 
so, his action would be viewed as an act of betrayal against the Mongols and he would be 
labeled as a traitor. The Mongols would then kill this traitor. The Arab amirs understood 
the Mongols' strict policies and sought to use them to their benefit. If they could frame 
the Armenian king as a traitor, then they could sit back and let Mongolian justice take its 
course. This incident shows the destructive potential of the Mongols' political and legal 
system on their vassals. 
Still another negative impact on the Armenian political system was that the 
alliance with the Mongols took away the Armenians' abilities to negotiate treaties. As 
part of the treaty of 1285, the Mamluk Sultan Baybars demanded the surrender of key 
fortresses in Cilician Armenia's possession. Hetum I did not want to give up these 
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frontier holdings because he feared the anger of the Mongols, who would blame him for 
having fallen under the influence of the Sultan if he gave them the fortresses the Mongols 
had captured. IS7 Vardan Arewelci described how the Armenians' conflict with the 
Mamluks came about: 
... The Sultan of Egypt called Pntxtar [Baybars] demanded the castles 
which Return, the king of Armenia, had taken with the Tatars' [Mongols'] 
support. When he did not give them up, notably because of his fear of the 
Tatars, he was greatly enraged. Gathering a vast army ... sent it against 
Cilicia ... [the Mamluks] captured the capital city Sis, the royal residence, 
burned it and the churches there ... Among the killed the foremost mortally 
wounded was the king's son Toros, in the flower of his youth ... [the] elder 
brother [Lewon] ... had been crowned and raised to the royal throne durin~ 
his father's [Return's] lifetime. [Lewon] was foremost of the captives ... I 8 
The Mamluks dealt massive blows to the Cilician Armenians, not only materially but also 
in the disruption and destruction of the Armenian leadership. King Return I lost his 
second son and heir, but more significant was the capture of his first son and primary 
heir. Ris first son, Lewon, had assumed joint rule with his father Heturn by this point; 
thus the Armenians truly lost one oftheir kings. Also, the fmancial and political burden 
the Cilician Armenians experienced to successfully ransom Lewon surely undercut 
significantly the kingdom's ability to recover from the Mamluks' devastation. 
Multiple Mamluk campaigns into Cilicia crushed Armenian resistance, forcing the 
Armenians to accept an embarrassing and extremely disadvantageous treaty in 1285. The 
treaty was negotiated separately from the Armenians' Mongol overlords and forced the 
Armenians to become vassals of the Mamluks. King Return I had to relinquish a number 
of key fortresses, while his son, Lewon, was forced to sign the peace treaty during his 
captivity in Egypt. The Arabic author Abd al-Zathir explained the terms ofthe ten-year 
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treaty: the Cilician Armenians had to pay an annual tribute of one million dirhams. The 
Armenians had to also give annually twenty-five pedigree horses, the same number in 
mules, and 10,000 iron bars for horseshoes and nails. 159 
After the ten-year treaty, the Mamluks, under the leadership of the Sultan AI-
Nasir Muhammad b. Qalawun (r. 1293-94,1299-1309,1310-1340), continued to exert 
economic pressure on Cilician Armenia and forced them to accept tributary status. 160 The 
Mamluks took advantage of the weak Armenian King Return II (r. 1295-96, 1299-1303, 
1303-1307) by conducting constant raids into Cilicia. Return II sought to appease the 
Egyptians with large sums of money, but this tactic failed, as did every attempt by the 
Armenians to repel Mamluk attacks. In 1292, the Sultan aI-Ashraf Khalil b. Qalawun (r. 
1290-93) seized Rromklay, which was the See of the Armenian Catholicos, situated on 
the Euphrates River. Return II had to provide a large sum of money and hand over the 
great fortress of Behest to secure the Catholicos's freedom from Egyptian captivity. 161 
After the fall of Hromklay in 1292, the Ilkhan Geikhatu (r. 1291-95) came 
forward and threatened the Mamluk Sultan aI-Ashraf, stating that since the Sultan sacked 
Hromklay, the Mongols would retaliate by attacking Aleppo. AI-Ashraf countered by 
threatening to sack Baghdad. From an analysis of Rashid aI-Din, it was not clear whether 
the Ilkhan issued this threat from some sense ofloyalty to the Armenians. What was clear 
was that AI-Ashrafs threat kept Geikhatu in Baghdad. In essence the Ilkhan chose to 
protect Baghdad instead of coming to the aid of the Cilician Armenians. 162 It was to be 
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expected that the Ilkhans would put the Ilkhanate's interests and protection before that of 
the Annenians and that this example was only one of what actually occurred. 
A curious event during the siege of Hromklay may show an example of the 
Mongol failure to offer military aid to the Annenians. During the siege King Hetum II 
attempted to relieve the city by a cunning tactic: the Annenians posed as Mongols by 
wearing Mongol caps (saraqujat) and attacking the Mamluk caravans and supply trains. 
This tactic proved unsuccessful once Sultan ai-Ashraf uncovered the ruse and attacked 
the citadel, securing the city for the Mamluks. 163 The primary sources, Abul-Fida and the 
Annenian fourteenth century chronicler Nerses Palients, never explained why the 
Annenians adopted this tactic. It was highly probable that the Armenians wished to 
capitalize on the Mongols' threatening and fierce presence, thus forcing their enemy to 
fight with more caution or hesitation. If this were true then why would the Annenians 
need to dress as Mongols unless they had no Mongols with them? To achieve their 
military tactic of Mongol intimidation, the Annenians would have to do it themselves. 
The adoption of this tactic may also show that the Annenians greatly needed the 
assistance of the Mongols, but did not receive it. Thus, this was another example of the 
Mongols failing to offer military protection to the Annenians. 
Mongol policy in Greater Annenia was not much different; they often failed to 
offer military protection to the princes of Greater Annenia and they forbade the princes 
from negotiating with other powers. It was crucial for the Mongols to aggressively 
enforce the latter policy because another Chinggisid branch, the Golden Horde, interacted 
with Greater Annenia and the Ilkhanate needed to ensure the Annenian princes' loyalty. 
This Ilkhanid policy was detrimental to Greater Annenia because it ensured that there 
163 Ibid. 186. 
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was always a strong enemy on the Armenians' doorstep, since the Golden Horde laid 
claim to the territories of the northern Caucasus. This fact, coupled with the Ilkhanate's 
inability to offer military protection, created a terrible situation for the Armenians. 
Armenia and Georgia became the primary battlegrounds between the Ilkhanate and the 
Golden Horde almost every year of the conflict in the second half of the thirteenth 
century. According to their subject status, the Greater Armenians had to side with the 
Ilkhans, which included providing provisions and troops. 164 It was entirely possible that 
an alliance with the Golden Horde could have offered more benefits to the Armenians 
than their present alliance with the Ilkhanate, but their alliance prevented them from 
opening negotiations with the Golden Horde. It also prevented them from negotiating 
peace treaties or any avenue that could stem the flow of supplies and men out of the 
country or end the devastation of the land. 
A great number of Armenians fought in the Mongol civil wars, as mentioned by 
Grigor: "Again the messengers of Manku ran [Mongke Khan] ordered the Armenian and 
Georgian forces, as well as the forces of Hulawu [HUlegii], to go and attack their armies 
and to slay them mercilessly. So they did. They killed so many that the mountains and 
plains stank from the bodies of the slain Tatars.,,165 These rebel Mongols were those sons 
of Mongke Khan who refused to accept HUlegii's appointment as Khan in the west. The 
four rebellious sons were killed and their armies defeated. 
In addition to preventing autonomous treaty negotiations, the Ilkhanid alliance 
brought the Armenians into political situations and negotiations that were often not 
advantageous for the Armenians. This was especially the case with the Egyptian 
164 Ibid. ISO. 
165 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 341. 
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Mamluks. It is surprising how intimately linked these three powers could be with one 
another. Grigor provided an explanation of a political arrangement made among the three 
kingdoms that seemed to offer a mixed bag for the Armenians: 
The King of the Armenians [Hetum I] ... sent an ambassador to the Sultan 
of Egypt to learn about his son Lewon, and what the wish of the Sultan 
might be, what he might give and ransom his son. The Sultan of Egypt, 
Pnduxtar [Baybars] ... when he heard of the arrival of the ambassadors he 
rejoiced and said, 'We should send Lewon to his father and to his 
kingdom. I have a beloved comrade a prisoner with the Tatars [Mongols]. 
Obtain him by your own efforts. If you want to get him from the Tatars 
they will not cause trouble. Take him, Syur [Sunqur al-Ashqar] 166 by 
name, and take Lewon away.' 167 
When considering this specific example, it had both beneficial and detrimental aspects 
for the Armenians. The Armenians' connection with the Mongols allowed them to broker 
the deal to secure Sunqur al-Ashqar for the Mamluks. In this case, the Armenians had 
something to offer the Mamluks in exchange for Lewon: 
The Armenian king at once gathering many treasures and precious things, 
went to the east to Abaya ran [Abaqa Khan]. He told him all of his 
complaints, what the Egyptians had done to him and his country. He also 
told of the request of the Sultan regarding the captive Syur [Sunqur], but 
he was unable to obtain him at once. He came back and sent his nephew, 
who with the aid of God went and brought Syur the captive to our 
country .... When the [Armenian] King sent to the Sultan saying, 'Syur has 
been brought,' the Sultan was very happy and at once dispatched Lewon 
with many presents. They (the Armenians) sent Syur with many presents. 
When Baron Lewon came, the King was very happy, and the princes of 
the country, as well as the monks and all Christians who were in the entire 
land. 168 
If the Armenians had not been connected to the Mongols, they would have had much less 
to offer the Mamluks and hence, fewer possibilities for peace. On the other hand, it was 
clearly detrimental to the Armenians that they could not negotiate their own treaties and 
166 Sunqur al-Ashqar was called the 'hunting falcon' and was captured by the Mongols when they took 
Aleppo in 1280, see Grigor, Nation of Archers, 390. 
167 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 369. 
168 Ibid. 371. 
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truly be able to put their interests first. The Armenians were also at a disadvantage when 
confronted by the Mamluks, because the Mamluks could and did act independently, but 
the Armenians were constrained by the Mongols. They had to allow the Mongols into 
their negotiations or they would be punished. They also had to rely on the Mongols 
militarily, because they could not successfully prosecute any campaigns. This can be seen 
from Hetum 1's failed incursions into northern Syria. 
Another negative aspect of the Mongol alliance for the Armenians was the very 
real threat of the Mongols themselves. If the Mongols perceived that a vassal had 
betrayed them they would seek retribution. There were several examples in which the 
Armenians were punished for transgressions, real or imagined. Early in their relationship 
with Mongke Khan, the Armenian and Georgian princes were accused of speaking 
boastful words against the Mongols saying they would beat them in battle. This was 
taken as a threat and act of treachery: "Then they (the Tatars) believed the false words 
and invaded our [Armenian and Georgian] country, taking as plunder all ofthe 
possessions and flocks of the people. But they did not kill the population, being without 
any order from the great Khan. They seized the King and all of the princes of the nation 
[and brought them to the court of the Mongol chieftain to be tried].,,169 Fortunately, the 
Armenian Prince Awag was able to convince the Mongols of their innocence and the 
Mongols stopped their destruction of the land. 
Another incident of Armenian/Georgian treachery did not end so positively. 
Vardan related the following episode: "[The Mongols] murdered at the court of [HUlegit] 
the Georgian general Zakare .. .in the flower of his youth .. .Indeed, they falsely accused 
169 Ibid. 323. 
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him of holding back the due tax at the time when he himself went to the COurt.,,170 Not 
even high-ranking nobles were safe from Mongol punishment. In fact, these leaders were 
the ones who bore the brunt of Mongol punishment and pressure. This struggle to walk a 
thin line was certainly a negative consequence and stressor in the Armenians' relationship 
with the Mongols. 
Both Greater Armenia and Cilician Armenia experienced heavy material burdens 
as a result of their alliances with the Mongols. Kirakos of Ganjak mentioned several 
different taxes imposed on the princes and territories of Greater Armenia. Kirakos had 
this to say on the taxation practices: "[the Mongols] began to harass them [the Armenian 
princes] through taxation, by traveling to and fro, and by soldiership and even more than 
this, they placed them under duress, but killed no one.,,171 One such financial burden was 
a tax levied against provincial peoples for the maintenance of the yam system. The yam 
was a well-maintained way station system that supported messenger riders, who 
transported messages across the Mongol Empire. Kirakos further reported that artisans, 
anglers, miners, and manufacturers were heavily taxed. The increased Mongol taxation in 
1245-46 drove some Armenian nobles from their lands and forced them to flee to their 
fortresses. Other Mongol taxes made some Caucasian nobles mortgage their estates to 
pay this tax. I72 Currently, historians have not found any comparative taxation data for 
Cilician Armenia. 
Some Armenians had already experienced heavy taxation at the hands of the 
Mongols. Grigor of Akner recounted taxes levied in 1251-52 in the 'upper districts of the 
170 Vardan, Compilation, 218. 
l7l Kirakos, the Armenians, quoted in Dashdondog, the Armenians, 115. 
172 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 119. 
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east.' This phrase was likely referencing Greater Armenia, being east of Cilician 
Armenia: 
A Tatar chieftain, Ardun by name, came by the command of Manku fan 
[Mongke Khan] and took a census of the eastern country for the taxes. 
From this time on they were wont to tax according to the number of heads 
of the people, as many were inscribed on the books, but still more they 
plundered the country of the east. In one small village they counted from 
thirty to fifty men all from fifteen to sixty years of age. They took sixty 
aspers from each person who was counted. 173 
These same tax rates (or very similar) were most likely in place when Hiilegii took power 
in 1260. 
The Mongols relied heavily on Greater Armenia to provide large supply trains for 
the Mongol army. The Armenians provided most of the provisions for the Mongol armies 
during their war with the Ismailis in 1256.174 According to Dashdondog, if all of the food 
levies were enforced, Greater Armenia would have surely faced economic crisis and 
famine in 1256.175 Rashid aI-Din also stated that the Armenians were the main foodstuffs 
provider to the Mongol armies. The Mongols decided to transport supplies from Armenia 
to Yazd and every community in these lands had to pay food levies, the ufagh and taghar, 
even when Greater Armenia faced famine in 1256.176 The taghar was to "be collected 
from each individual listed in the royal register. From such they demanded one hundred 
fitrs [pounds] of grain, fifty litrs of wine, two fitrs of rice and hllSks, three sacks, two 
cords, one spitak [silver coin], one arrow, let alone the other bribes; and one in every 
twenty animals plus twenty spitaks.,,177 This was a great sum to be paid and it was 
173 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 325. 
174 Dashdondog. the Armenians. 113. 
175 Ibid. 113-114. 
176lbid. 126. 
177 Kirakos, the Armenians, quoted in Dashdondog. the Armenians. 113. 
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unclear whether this tax was enacted on an annual or other temporal basis, or on the 
command of the Illrnan. 
Greater Armenia and Cilician Armenia both experienced great material 
destruction of their lands and cities as a result oftheir alliances with the Mongols. Greater 
Armenia was the battleground between the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde; therefore 
their lands were often ruined and their lands had not yet recovered from the two previous 
Mongol invasions. Cilician Armenia experienced widespread destruction from the 
numerous Mamluk raids and expeditions. All of CiIician Armenia's cities were 
devastated at least once, especially the capital of Sis. 
Perhaps greater than the destruction of land was the loss of human lives. The 
primary sources included numerous references to the high mortality experienced by the 
Armenian military and its nobility. The Caucasian forces made up a large percentage of 
the Ilkhanid army through most of the Armenian-Ilkhanid alliance. This would have been 
a large drain on Caucasian society. One such example was that more than one third of the 
Mongol army commanded by Mengu Temur in 1281, was made up of Armenians, 
Georgians and other auxiliary cavalry.178 There was immense pressure on the Armenian 
princes to consistently provide large numbers of troops to the Mongols. HUlegii pushed 
for Armenian and Georgian lords to participate in his further conquests or in his wars 
against his Mongol relatives, in particular between 1260-65. The Armenians and 
Georgians experienced high casualties from both, much more so during the inter-familial 
wars. 179 Kirakos of Ganjak attributed the Caucasian lords' rebellion (1259-61) in large 
part to the Mongols' great demands for troops. The Georgian King David I (r. 1258-
178 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 227. 
179 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 156. 
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1293) refused Hiilegii's order to support his conquest of Syria and Egypt by providing 
troops. David and the Georgians were exhausted from battling for Baghdad and this was 
the reasoning given for his refusal to follow Hiilegii's orders. 180 
In addition to the losses incurred by the regular soldiery, the Armenian nobles 
experienced significant mortality because of their role as martial leaders. Stepannos 
Orbelian related how the young prince Burtel Orbelian was killed in the northern 
Caucasus in 1261-62 while serving Hiilegii against Berke Khan, khan of the Golden 
Horde (d. 1266).181 Vardan Arewelci related another casualty during the siege of the City 
of Martyrs in 1260 during Hiilegii's initial conquest in the Middle East: "The City of 
Martyrs was taken after much misery and damage, not only for the besieged but also for 
the besieging Tatar soldiers and the Christians with them. They battled each other within 
and without; and there the handsome youth Sewada Xaceneci, son of the great prince 
Grigor, was killed fighting valiantly. He was crowned with those who keep the faith and 
fear of God and of the Il_khan ... ,,182 
There were several competing theories on why the Mongols would utilize the 
Armenian armies to such a great extent. According to Reuven Amitai-Preiss: 
Because the Mongols considered their subject people expendable, they 
usually designated them as advance attackers. This was not, as the History 
of Kartli and Grigor of Akner would have us believe, because the 
Armeno-Georgian troops were such excellent warriors, but first precisely 
because the Caucasians were expendable and second, because desertion 
was impossible with forei§n troops fighting in front or in detachments 
surrounded by Mongols. 18 
180 Ibid. 153. 
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If this were the case, certainly the Armenians would not have benefited from this 
advance attackers tactic and it certainly called into question the overall worth of the 
Armenian-Ilkhanid alliance. 
Finally, the Armenians experienced territorial losses as a result of their alliance 
with the Ilkhanid Mongols. Cilician Armenia quickly lost all of the lands it had gained 
through its raids into northern Syria. The Cilician Armenians' war with the Mamluks 
eventually destroyed the entire Kingdom of Cilician Armenia in 1375. If it had not been 
for their alliance with the Mongols, the Cilician Armenians may not have come into 
direct contact with the Mamluks or instigated Mamluk retaliation. But as this was the 
case, the Mamluks crushed them. 
In summarizing the above evidence, it was clear that the Armenians experienced 
many more negative consequences from their alliance with the Ilkhanid Mongols than 
positive consequences. On first consideration this notion may seem surprising as the 
prevailing viewpoint of the time was that the Mongols were the most powerful and 
successful force in the region and it was presumed that they would continue in this role. 
External enemies, such as the Egyptian Mamluks and the Golden Horde, played a part in 
keeping the Mongols from fulfilling their lordly obligations to the Armenians, but it was 
the demands of the Mongols themselves on their Armenian vassals that ultimately 
showed how the Mongol-Armenian alliance was predominantly negative for the 
Armenians. 
Both Greater Armenia and the kingdom of Cilician Armenia submitted to the 
Mongols, although under different circumstances. The princes of Greater Armenia 
surrendered after a hard fought resistance, while Cilician Armenia voluntarily 
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surrendered before the Mongols could devastate the kingdom. Mongol terms of 
submission required the Armenian leaders to provide troops and provisions to the Mongol 
army; accept Mongol overlordship; act as a loyal vassal; and pay taxes. In exchange, the 
Mongols often returned the land to the nobility and showed political favoritism; offered 
pardons and military protection; instilled religious tolerance; preserved internal 
administration; instituted selective tax exemptions; and offered noble marriages into the 
Chinggisid line. Of these benefits, the Armenians received almost all of them on a 
selective basis. The most important benefit, military protection, was sorely lacking. 
The Armenians received few of the benefits they actively sought, such as tax 
exemptions for churches; the liberation of the Holy Land; the safeguarding of Christianity 
in Mongol conquered cities and the spread of Christianity through the Mongol Empire; 
the acquisition of land in northern Syria; and the attainment of wealth and political power 
in their surrounding regions. The most significant aspect that shaped Mongol-Armenian 
relations into a chiefly negative venture for the Armenians was the weight and severity of 
Mongol demands. The constant demand for supplies and troops drained both Greater 
Armenia and Cilician Armenia, leaving their peoples vulnerable to enemy attacks and 
famine. As a result of showing their loyalty to the Mongol alliance, Cilician Armenia was 
consistently attacked and devastated by the Mamluks, while Greater Armenia suffered 
from the raids of the Golden Horde. The Armenians were never able to negotiate their 
own peace treaties, which left them in a constant state of war with an absent military ally. 
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THE MONGOLS AND THE EGYPTIAN MAMLUKS 
This section will examine primary evidence in English translation relating to the 
interactions between the Ilkhanid Mongols and the Egyptian Mamluks. This section will 
ultimately argue that based on the analysis of primary and secondary literature, the 
Mamluks gained more beneficial outcomes from their adversarial relationship with the 
Ilkhanid Mongols and these benefits greatly overshadowed the negatives. Ultimately 
waging war on the Mongols proved highly beneficial in the long term for the Mamluks. 
This runs contrary to the expectation that being an enemy of the Mongols would prove to 
be highly destructive for any of their enemies. 
This section will begin with a summary of the Mamluk overthrow of the Egyptian 
Ayyubid Sultanate and their initial interactions with the Ilkhanid Mongols. Next, there 
will be an analysis of the benefits the Mamluks earned from being an enemy of the 
Ilkhanate, both those they actively pursued and those earned unexpectedly. The chief 
benefit was that the threat of the Mongols provided the clear impetus to have a martial 
ruling system in Egypt and that waging warfare extended the ruling legitimacy for the 
Mamluks. It also allowed them to show themselves as the protector and patron of Islam 
and they had a clear target in these Mongol outsiders to wage jihad against. Finally, the 
Mongol conquest of Baghdad initiated the re-Iocation of the Caliphate in Cairo. 
The focus will then shift to analyzing the negative effects the Mamluks 
experienced from their war with the llkhanate. These negative effects are divided into 
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subtopics: the impact of the Ilkhanid conversion to Islam; the loss of ruling legitimacy 
when compared to the noble Chinggisid bloodline; Mongol threats to Mamluk. 
commercial interests; as well as material losses. 
From the beginning of their interactions with the llkhanid Mongols, the Mamluks 
took an adversarial stance. On the eve of Hiilegii's march west, the Mamluks were locked 
in an intense civil war. The Mamluks had successfully seized the Egyptian throne in 1250 
from the Ayyubid dynasty, but the Mamluks quickly began fighting among themselves. 
The newly installed Sultan Aybeg feared the Bahriyya's power and murdered their leader 
Faris aI-Din Aqtay. Most of the Bahriyya, some 700 mamluks, with their leader Baybars 
fled to Syria in 1254. Baybars and his men spent the next several years serving aI-Nasir 
Yusuf, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus, and al-Mughith Umar, ruler of Karak. 184 
During this chaotic time, Sultan Aybeg died, leaving the throne to his young son. 
Aybeg's favored mamluk, Qutuz, installed the son of Aybeg on the throne as a puppet 
and Qutuz ruled through him for a time. Qutuz then deposed the boy and took direct 
control in 1259. Qutuz rose to power and justified taking the throne because of the 
Mongols' advance west. Upon Qutuz's rise, he and Baybars reconciled and Baybars 
returned to Egypt. 185 
Despite deposing the Ayyubids in Egypt, the Ayyubid princes remained strong 
and influential in others areas of the Middle East, Syria in particular. Upon the eve of the 
expected Mongol invasion, the Mamluks attempted to gain Ayyubid allies in Syria, both 
to gamer military support and consolidate their own position to avoid war on multiple 
fronts. As with the Ilkhanid Mongols, the Mamluk.s had mixed results in securing strong 
184 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 19. 
185 Qutuz was the actual killer of Aqtay, former leader of the Bahriyya and Baybars's leader. 
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alliances with the Ayyubids. They too had to deal with the duplicity of aI-Nasir Yusufb. 
al-Aziz Muhammad, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus. One of the main factors for 
Baybars's return to Egypt was because Yusuf could not take a decisive stance toward the 
Mongols. But the Mamluks did gain a stable ally in aI-Mansur Muhammad b. al-
Muzaffar Mahmud, ruler of Hama. For his faithfulness he was rewarded by regaining his 
kingdom and acquiring the lands ofMaarrat al-Numan and Barin. 186 
The Mamluks were military elites of the Eurasian steppe who converted to Islam 
and functioned as the urban military class in Egypt. 187 They ruled over large Muslim 
populations and based their armies on disciplined masses of mounted archers, which was 
a testament to their Kipchak origin. 188 The early Mamluk sultans like Qutuz and Baybars, 
created a larger and stronger army through more intense training; firmly managed and 
utilized the Bedouins; 189 erected fortifications; established an effective espionage system; 
organized the military administration; established rapid communications throughout the 
country; and integrated Syria into the Mamluk kingdom. 190 
The Mamluks' sources of military manpower came from multiple areas. Their 
primary and most reliable source was men from now defunct Ayyubid principalities. The 
second was from a steady stream of refugees from Mongol territories. Some were actual 
Mongol tribesmen while others were indigenous Muslims, including mamluks, who had 
186 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkanid War, 45. 
187 Ibid. 2. 
188 Ibid. 2. 
189 The Bedouins controlled the fluctuating frontier with Ilkhanid Iraq; they conducted raids into Mongol 
territory; they acted as military auxiliaries and as scouts and intelligence gatherers. But, they could ally 
with the Mongols whenever they were dissatisfied with the sultan, see Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid 
War, 64. 
190 The Ilkhanid war with the Golden Horde ensured the Mamluks that the Ilkhanids were fighting on at 
least two frontiers and could never concentrate their forces, see Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 87. 
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escaped Mongol contro1. 191 Finally, the Mamluk sultan bought slaves and raised them to 
serve in his mamluk royal guard. They also acted as the backbone of his army. The 
sultan's amirs raised their own private forces, which included some mamluks. 192 
According to Amitai-Preiss, the Mamluks had numerous advantages over their 
Mongol enemy: 
The Mamluks had the advantage of morale over the enemy. They were 
fighting (usually) on home territory, for their religion, their kingdom, and 
their lives. They were also defending their status as a ruling caste. To their 
mind, they had no choice but to win. The sultans did their best to inculcate 
these feelings in their followers. The Mongols may have been fighting for 
an abstract imperial ideal, for personal honor, and for booty, but they 
could not compete with the Mamluks for motivation. 193 
Direct interaction with the Mongols did not come until 1259-60, when the Ilkhan 
Hiilegfi sent envoys to Egypt. They delivered a letter to the Sultan Qutuz demanding his 
submission to the Ilkhanate. The letter contained verses from the Koran and was couched 
in Islamic terms, but the message was clearly Mongol: God [Tenggri] had given the 
Mongols the right to rule the world, therefore all should submit to them. Those who 
refused would be killed. Hiilegfi also insulted Qutuz's lowly origins as a mamluk. The 
Arabic author Ibn al-Furat stated that Hiilegii's letter said the following: "He [Sultan 
Qutuz] is of the race ofmamluks who fled before our [Mongol] sword into this [Egypt] 
country, who enjoyed its comforts and then killed its rulers [the Ayyubids].,,194 But the 
threat in Hiilegii's letter did not prompt Qutuz to submit. Instead, Qutuz received 
191 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 70-71. 
192 Ibid. 72. 
193 Ibid. 234. 
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permission from his am irs to execute the Mongol envoys. The envoys were cut in half 
and their heads were displayed at Bab al-Zuwayla in Cairo. 195 
Benefits of an Anti-Mongol Stance 
The new Mamluk sultans saw the imminent Mongol threat as the chief means for 
shoring up their control over the Egyptian throne. Being a martial class, the Mamluk 
leaders argued that they were best equipped to handled the Mongol threat and that they 
should rule the kingdom. This type of justification was needed to quell any internal 
discord that still remained from Qutuz's controversial rise to power. According to AI-
Jazari: "From the beginning of his reign, Qutuz had pursued an unequivocal anti-Mongol 
policy. He had used the need to resist the Mongols as the justification for his disposal of 
aI-Mansur Ali b. Aybeg [leader of the Bahriyya] and his own accession to the throne 
(November 1259).,,196 
The military threat of the Mongols kept the Mamluks' main ruling system, that of 
the military, in practice and relevant. According to Linda Northrup: 
The military crises of the thirteenth century had demanded discipline. 
Galvanized by the Mongol threat and the Crusader presence, the new 
Mamluk regime had insisted on hard training, slow promotion and gradual 
pay increases. Discipline had instilled a value system in which individual 
merit and achievement were eventually well rewarded and which made the 
early Mamluk army the strongest in the region at that time ... 197 
195 Ibid. 36. 
196 AI-Jazari furthered stated: "The story is told that Qutuz claimed that he was descended from the 
Khwarazm-shah Ala aI-Din Muhammad, and thus his emerging struggle with the Mongols also had an 
element of personal revenge in it," AI-Jazari, Hawadith ai-zaman, quoted in Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-
Ilkhanid War, 35. 
197 Linda Northrup, "The Bahri Mamluk sultanate," ed. Carl F. Petry, M.W. Daly, The Cambridge History 
of Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),261-62. 
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This fierce discipline was accompanied by severe punishments and allowed the Mamluk 
sultan to rule his military and kingdom with an iron fist. One can see such examples in 
the actions of the general, and later Sultan, Baybars: "The [Mamluk] army reacted swiftly 
to the slightest rumor of a Mongol offensive and Baybars himself either led the troops or 
was right behind them. The continuing war also strengthened his rule, because in the face 
of the Mongol danger Baybars would brook no disloyalty.,,198 
When it came to clashes on the battlefield with the Mongols, the Mamluks proved 
their military prowess. Through numerous victories over the Mongols, who were thought 
invincible, the Mamluks exhibited that they could protect the kingdom and hence should 
continue to rule. The Mamluks' greatest victory over the Mongols came at Ayn Jalut (the 
Pools of Goliath), near Nazareth, on September 3, 1260. Upon hearing that Hiilegii had 
pulled out the majority of his troops from Syria only leaving a small force under the 
general Kitbugha behind, the Mamluks decided to strike and attempt to dislodge the 
Mongols from Syria. In Vardan Arewelci's description of the battle, he attributed the 
Mongols' loss to their small numbers: 
In the same year the army which the II-khan Hulawu [Hiilegii] had left to 
guard the land ofSrun [Syria], about 20,000 men under the great general 
called Kitbula [Kitbugha], a Christian by religion, was slaughtered in a 
battle against the Sultan of Egypt at the foot of Mount Tabor. He had a 
numberless multitude, and since the forces of [Kit-] Bula were few, they 
were slaughtered or taken captive. But some scattered and hid and 
escaped. They came to the king of Armenia, from whom they found great 
compassion; [he provided] clothing, horses, and money, so they returned 
gratefully to their lord, Tatars and Christians .199 
The Mamluk advance force, under the command of Baybars, found Kitbugha's 
army near Tiberias in North Palestine and was joined there by Sultan Qutuz's main army. 
198 Amitai.Preiss, Mamluk.Ilkhanid War, 234. 
199 Vardan, Compilation, 218. 
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Grigor of Akner gave a similar description of the battle, but with interesting facets of its 
own: 
Then Kitbuya [Kitbugha], who was the commander of the Tatar force, 
becoming overweening, went out to a place ten days journey from 
Jerusalem. Then the <doglike> and lawless Egyptians, learning that the 
army of Tatars was living in unpreparedness, gathered their forces and 
with countless multitudes fell upon the Tatars, killed many of them, put 
many to flight, and captured many ... 200 
The mamluk Sarim aI-Din Uzbak witnessed the battle from the Mongol side and 
described it as a hard fought battle. The Mongols flrst broke the Egyptian left wing, but 
Sultan Qutuz rallied his troops and drove the Mongols onto marshy land. The Mongol 
commander Kitbugha was killed and the Mongols fled. They then made a stand at 
Baysan, but were defeated by Baybars.201 The battle was hard fought because the armies 
were of similar makeup and skill level: "The two armies confronting one another were 
similar in that their best troops were horse archers of Turco-Mongol stock, but in both 
cases this regular cavalry force was swollen by a larger body of men furnished by allies, 
tributaries, skirmishers, tribesmen flghting for the promise ofbooty.,,202 
The true victory for the Mamluks was breaking the belief in Mongol invincibility 
on the battlefleld. This was a huge morale boost for the Mamluks, proving the military 
might of the Bahri mamluks, and would prove to be a powerful tool in future negotiations 
with the Ilkhanid Mongols.203 When considering further beneflts of the Mamluk victory 
at Ayn Jalut, scholarly opinions diverge. According to Robert Irwin, the Mamluk victory 
only saved the Mamluks for a time and it had not decided anything in the long term 
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201 Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 34. 
202 Ibid. 34. 
203 Another Mamluk victory that bolstered Mamluk ruling legitimacy was the Battle of Horns on October 
29/30,1281, see Dashdondog, the Armenians, 175. 
80 
because the Mongols returned to campaign in Syria in 1261, 1280, 1299, 1301, and 
1303.204 
According to Northrup, the Mamluk victory at Ayn Jalut delivered Syria fIrmly 
into Mamluk hands. Syria before this had been divided among Ayyubid family members 
and although a treaty was signed in 1253 to break Ayyubid power, Ayn Jalut fIrmly 
confIrmed Mamluk victory over the Ayyubids. 205 A third theory came from David 
Saunders who argued that the battle of Ayn Jalut stopped Mongol expansion westward 
and saved Cairo. Saunders also said that it saved Islam in the region and stopped 
Christian restoration in the Near East.206 Only hindsight can offer an argument such as 
Saunders's. At the time, nothing was certain and the Mongol threat was still very real and 
immediate. 
The Mamluks successfully utilized their past military victories against the 
Mongols to counter Mongol demands for submission, essentially stating that the Mongols 
could not make them submit because the Mongols could not defeat the Mamluks on the 
battlefield. The mentionings of past victories became a common and effective refrain in 
the diplomatic letters that passed back and forth between the Sultan and Ilkhan. After the 
Mongols' defeat at the battle of Horns in 1281, the Ilkhan Teguder sent an embassy to 
Cairo, demanding that Mamluk raids cease on Ilkhanid lands and for the sultan to submit. 
Teguder threatened that he would fight the sultan to expel him from Ilkhanid lands. 
The Sultan Qalawun's letter of reply brought up two military thorns in the 
Ilkhanid side, Horns and Ayn Jalut, and avoided a direct answer to the demand for 
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submission. Qalawun also ridiculed the llkhanid armies who had lost in Syria.207 
Qalawun's answer was as follows: "You [Teguder] send us [Qalawun] word that if strife 
is not to cease between us, that we had better choose a battlefield, and that God will give 
victory to whom He will. Here is our answer: Those of your troops who survived their 
last defeat are not anxious to revisit the former battlefield. They fear to go there again to 
renew their misfortunes ... ,,208 By the second Ilkhanid embassy to Egypt, the threat to 
fight the sultan was dropped. 
This Mamluk confidence in their military continued throughout their interactions 
with the Ilkhanate. During the first campaign of the Ilkhan Ghazan in 1299 he dealt the 
Mamluks a military blow by defeating them in battle at Wadi al-Khaznadar (although it 
was a very costly victory for the Mongols). Despite this defeat, the Mamluks were still 
confident in their martial abilities and when Ghazan attempted to use his military victory 
in his diplomatic negotiations, the Mamluks successfully countered his demands and 
gloating. They did this by trumpeting their numerous victories against the Mongols in the 
past. According to Thomas Raff, the Mamluk sultan's courier, Husam ad-Din al-Mugiri, 
gave a rendition of the message he was entrusted to relate to Ghazan Khan after the 
Mamluks' defeat at Wadi al-Khaznadar. When baited with the question of why the 
Mamluks had fled the battlefield, Husam ad-Din al-Mugiri replied: 
The army of the Tatars [Mongols] has been fleeing from us [Mamluks] for 
sixty years and we have fled only once ... We did not flee from you for fear 
of your numbers or of your followers' strength but because we 
underestimated you ... We have defeated you numerous times for a period 
of sixty years ... So encountering you (on the field) continued to be the 
easiest thing possible for us ... We set out against you with but a quarter of 
our armies because of our lack of concern for yoU.209 
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Growing military power led to growing political power for the Mamluks. The 
Mamluks could and did successfully counter Mongol threats and kept the Mongols at 
bay. They also kept the Mongols from aiding their ally, the Armenians. One such 
example of this was after the Mamluk Sultan aI-Ashraf sacked the Armenian city of 
Hromklay in 1292. The Ilkhan Geikhatu threatened the Sultan, stating that he would take 
Aleppo, and the Sultan countered by threatening to take Baghdad. The Sultan's threat 
kept Geikhatu in Baghdad and from aiding the Armenians.2lO 
Another aspect of the Mongols that worked in the Mamluks' favor was that the 
Ilkhanid Mongols provided a clear example of the 'Other' and the infidel. This allowed 
the Mamluk sultans to direct their wars against the Mongols as holy wars,jihad, and to 
present themselves as the protectors and saviors of Islam. And as a military regime, the 
Mamluks needed to conduct jihad to maintain their legitimacy. Also, any connection to 
Islamic holy principles like jihad served to bolster the Mamluk regime, as well since 
Islam was the defining social force in Egypt. A good Muslim ruler, as the sultan should 
be, had to perform certain obligations for his people and God. In order to connect 
themselves with the past regimes and show themselves to be good Muslim rulers (and 
worthy of being Muslim rulers), the Mamluks took very seriously the importance of 
performing these vital functions. The sultan must protect his lands and subjects as a 
military guardian ofIslam and uphold Islamic law (shariah).211 He must participate in 
military action against non-Muslim aggressors on behalf of Islam (jihad).212 The duty of 
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jihad had fallen into decline with the Ayyubid sultans, but the Mamluks were quick to 
revive this discarded combative ideal, as it was the mainstay of their ideology.213 
The Armenians also provided a model of 'the Other' and the infidel for the 
Mamluks. The Mamluks fought the Christian knights in the Holy Land and they began 
their wars with the Armenians in 1259/60. The Armenians certainly saw the Islamic 
Mamluks as a threat to Christianity, as shown in Grigor's writings: 
The Sultan, learning what the Armenian King's opinion was [to not 
surrender], sent many of his troops against the country of the Armenians 
by the route of Mari, while he himself took up his position in Xarxe. He 
ordered his army to go into the land, mercilessly to slaughter the 
Christians, destroy the churches and bum the buildings of towns and 
villages, to remain in the land fifteen days and take prisoners the women 
and children of the Christians, which they did.214 
The war with the Armenians offered another worthy and valuable jihad for the Mamluks, 
which they took advantage of: 
[The Mamluks] burned the town of Sis, which was the seat of the 
Armenian kings. They cast wood into the fine and great church which was 
in the center of Sis and they burned it. They demolished the tombs of the 
kings. They killed many Christians and took many captives from the land 
and villages. After several days the Turkish [Mamluk] army, with much 
treasure and plunder, went to their own country, leaving the land of 
Armenia half ruined. 215 
Sultan aI-Ashraf Khalil Cr. 1290-1293) certainly took up this idea of utilizing the 
'Other' for the justification of war. He defined his rule by martial conquest, expansion, 
and universal rule as the Guardian of Islam. Chief among his tasks was warring against 
infidels. This belligerent stance was clearly represented in his letters when he used 
heraldic titles such as 'Defeater of Infidels' and 'Annihilator of Franks, Armenians, and 
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Mongols. ,216 He was also careful to promote policies similar to past sultans, primarily his 
father, Qalawun, and Baybars, against the Mongols. Khalil had an easy job of gaining 
support for his campaigns against the Mongols because the Ilkhan Geikhatu was a pagan, 
i.e. infidel. This eliminated any complicating issues of religion. Khalil could easily show 
himself to be the Guardian ofIslam.217 Prior to Geikhatu's reign (1291-1295) several of 
the Ilkhans had converted to Islam, which made the practice of conducting jihad much 
more complicated. 
Despite the material destruction of Baghdad and the murder of the caliph, the 
Islamic Mamluks actually benefited from Baghdad's fall, along with the toppling of the 
Caliphate. The Sultan Baybars took the opportunity to establish a new Caliphate in Cairo 
in 1260_61.218 The caliph became central to Mamluk kingship inside their lands since the 
Abbasid Caliphate sanctioned Mamluk rule. The caliph also preached jihad and called the 
Mamluks 'warriors of the faith,' mujahidun.219 Baybars attributed great importance to the 
establishment of the Caliphate in Cairo and sought to link himself to the caliph as much 
as possible. On Baybars's coins and inscriptions he called himself 'associate of the 
commander of the faithful.' This linked him with the head of his faith while making him 
look pious and humble by not calling himself the commander of the faithful. Ibn al-Furat 
wrote of how the caliph gave Baybars an investiture diploma (taqlid) that confirmed 
Baybars as sultan. He then called on Baybars to conduct holy war (jihad) and he 
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proclaimed Baybars the ruler of all lands of the Mamluk Sultanate and those lands under 
the infidel to be liberated.220 
Although there was a significant drain on military manpower as a result of 
campaigns against the Mongols, the Mamluks found valuable and capable warriors for 
their army among disaffected or rebel Mongols. These units greatly improved the 
performance of the Mamluk military and certainly contributed to its long-term success: 
"The Kurdish, Turkoman, and Mongol tribal warriors who had joined the Mamluks in the 
turmoil accompanying the Mongol advance in the Middle East constituted the most 
valuable units of the Haiqa.,,221 The Halqa consisted of freeborn cavalry soldiers of 
diverse provenance who served under the Mamluks. The Mamluks also aided rebel 
Mongols in their wars against the Ilkhanate, which was usually a benefit for them. One 
such example was Sulemish, who was an important Mongol general in Anatolia who 
rebelled in the winter of 1289-90. The Mamluks promised to support him. Sulemish 
received support and even retreated to Cairo. Unfortunately, this particular venture did 
not work out for the Mamluks as Sulemish was quickly defeated by those he betrayed.222 
Until 1295 the Mamluks primarily fought the Ilkhanate on the battlefield and in 
diplomacy. But from the Ilkhan Ghazan's conversion to Islam in 1295 forward, the 
Mamluks had to contend with the Mongols through religion. There had been Ilkhanid 
converts before this time, but they were not able to effect change within the Ilkhanate or 
threaten the Mamluks in any way with their conversion. Ghazan Khan (r. 1295 to 1304) 
established a strong Muslim legacy with his conversion to Islam and showed his 
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commitment to his new religion by largely abandoning the title of'Illillan' and adopting 
the Islamic title of 'Sultan' and 'Emperor of Islam.' He also toyed with the title 'Islamic 
centennial renewer. ,223 
Interestingly, it was the Mongols who opened the door for the Mamluks to 
establish themselves as the protector and patron of Islam. According to Northrup: 
As a consequence of the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258 and the 
transfer of the caliphate to Cairo, the sultan in Cairo had inherited 
Baghdad's political and religious role in the region as protector of the two 
holy cities in Arabia- Mecca and Medina ... a responsibility which every 
sultan took seriously since it served to bolster claims to legitimacy. Thus 
the sultan sought to demonstrate his interest in the holy cities symbolically 
through the titulary, by sending each year with much pomp and ceremony 
the kiswa, or covering of the Kaba, by the construction and repair of 
monuments, and by making the pilgrimage when possible.224 
In addition to the religious and symbolic power gained from being the patron of 
Islam, the Mamluks also received economic benefits: "The trade routes also carried 
pilgrim traffic to the holy sites. Though obliged to secure the safe passage of pilgrims, the 
sultan also benefited from the important revenue collected from them. The protection of 
these interests thus involved not only diplomacy but occasionally merited limited military 
intervention in quarrels between the rulers of the Hijaz.,.225 
The Ilkhanate's conversion meant that the Mongols and Mamluks now had to 
compete for the same Islamic positions, titles, and honors available in the Islamic 
religious community. The two main honorifics were 'Patron ofIslam' and 'Guardian of 
Islam.' By the late 1310s, the Mongol and Mamluk rulers were chiefly competing for 
these titles and positions through political, material or diplomatic expressions of power. 
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The martial battlefield had faded. The holy cities of Arabia (the Hijaz) became central to 
the expressions of ideology between the Mongols and Mamluks.226 The Mamluks were 
successful in proving themselves the first patron of the Hijaz, forcing the Ilkhan Abu Said 
(1316-1335) to accept a secondary position. For a short time the Mamluks lost the upper 
hand in the Hijaz, but by 1333, the Sultan Muhammad (r. 1310-1340) had re-estab1ished 
his primacy in the Hijaz, despite Abu Said efforts.227 Any victory over the Mongols, 
especially religious, increased Mamluk power. As the Mamluks continued to rise, the 
Ilkhanate began to fade. 
In addition to competing as the primary patron of Islam, the two superpowers of 
the Middle East also competed over which ruler, the Mamluk or Ilkhanid sultan, ruled by 
the virtues of a true Muslim king. The ability to show that he ruled by Islamic law and 
virtues greatly improved a sultan's image and power, as well as legitimacy. Both the 
Mamluks and the Ilkhanid sultans needed this legitimacy. Two important kingly virtues 
were justice tempered with mercy228 and obedience to God. The sultan also had to show 
that he was God's Chosen Ruler.229 
Finally, the Mamluks experienced material benefits from their adversarial stance 
against the Mongols. The threat of the Mongols in Syria compelled the majority of the 
Syrian factions to side with the Mamluks, thus the Mamluks gained these Syrian 
territories.23o Syria became and remained a permanent territory of the Mamluk kingdom 
long after the Ilkhanate had collapsed. Again, the actions of the Mongols had unintended 
consequences for the Mamluks, but ultimately to their benefit. In the realms of trade "the 
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expansion of the Mongols eventually opened up new trade routes with central Asia to 
supplement those linking Egypt to the east via the Red Sea: commercial links in the 
Mediterranean between Egypt and Latin crusades ... ,.231 This was especially important for 
the Mamluks because Egypt depended on the trade of luxury goods for much of its 
material wealth and these goods came from India and the East. These routes then passed 
through Egypt and Syria to European markets. 
The Mamluks also experienced a heightening of cultural and intellectual activity, 
as Cairo replaced fallen Baghdad as the principal center for the cultural activity of the 
Islamic Near East.232 According to Northrup: "The Egyptian capital functioned as a 
cultural magnet, attracting Muslim scholars and others from throughout the Near East, 
immigrants who lent a profoundly cosmopolitan air to Egyptian society, at least at its 
higher levels.,,233 This heightened culture would remain in the Mamluk kingdom and 
many of Islam's greatest treasures and achievements were created during the Mamluk 
period. 
Negative Effects of an Anti-Mongol Stance 
There were several major setbacks that the Mamluks experienced from their 
interactions with the Ilkhanid Mongols, the most serious of which threatened the 
Mamluks' continued existence as a ruling class and their control of the Sultanate. 
Throughout their rule, the Mamluks suffered from an extremely weak claim to the throne. 
This was clearly because of their origins as slaves. The Mamluks were ridiculed for their 
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slave origins, but they were also ridiculed for their absolute lack of proper or royal 
lineage. These shortcomings may have not been so debilitating if the foe the Mamluks 
pitted themselves against had a lesser lineage as well. Instead, the Mongols sported one 
of the strongest lineages in the Middle East during this time. It was based both on 
military prowess and well-established royal bloodlines. The Ilkhanate was still a symbol 
of Mongol prestige and carried the weight of the Chinggisid Divine Mandate.234 
F or the Mongols, the rule of the Mamluks was an affront to all those who ruled as 
a right of their noble blood. The Mamluks carried no royal blood and even worse, they 
were slaves and continued this slave system. Those who ruled as sultans in the Mamluk 
kingdom had began their careers as slaves and only those who had been slaves, mamluks, 
were eligible to rule according to the Mamluk sultanate system. For the Mongols, a ruling 
and military system based on slaves was perverse and could only be weak and 
ineffectual. Other nomads and Mongolians were enslaved during Chinggis's reign and 
were incorporated into a hereditary system of slavery (Otegii boghul); slavery was the 
condition of lesser people.235 The Mamluks did have some understanding of this type of 
slavery, since they were of Turkish Kipchak origin and such slavery was typical in 
nomadic societies. 
The Mongols and their allies the Armenians insulted and degraded the Mamluk 
sultans during most of their diplomatic interactions. When Hiilegii demanded the 
submission of the Mamluk Sultan Qutuz in 1260, Hiilegii denigrated Qutuz for his servile 
origins. Hiilegii's Armenian ally, Hetum I, called the Sultan Baybars a dog and slave and 
refused to deal with him. Grigor related one version of this event; "On his way to Egypt 
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the Sultan of Egypt died and they appointed Pntuxtar [Baybars] Sultan of Egypt. Having 
heard this, the King of the Annenians called him a <dog> and a slave.,,236 
Grigor described another episode, which related the diplomatic tensions between 
the Mamluks and Armenians. In this episode, the Mamluk Sultan Baybars harassed the 
Armenian prince, Lewon, the first son of Hetum I. Lewon at this time was in Mamluk 
custody after being captured in battle: 
After this the Sultan spoke to Lewon and said, 'Your father called me a 
slave and would not make peace. Am I the slave now, or you?' He said 
this and many other words of reproach to the King's son, and then 
thereafter he greatly honored him and showed him affection, uttering 
words of comfort, not to fear anything, but to remain cheerful for some 
days and then he would send him back to his father the King of the 
Armenians. With these words the Sultan Pntuxtar [Baybars] sent Baron 
Lewon to Egypt. 237 
The fact that the Annenians could use such an insult against the Mamluks must 
have infuriated the Mamluks and further eroded their ruling legitimacy. In his letters to 
the Mamluk Sultan Qalawun in 1299-1300, the Ilkhan Ghazan showed his disdain for the 
mamluk slaves and their lack of lineage. He labeled them as the lowest race, min ardhal 
al-ajnas.238 This was clearly an issue of great insult to the Mongols throughout their rule 
in the Ilkhanate and a consistent and effective means of quickly establishing their 
political superiority over the Mamluks. 
The Mamluks sought to compensate for their political weakness and concurrently 
counter the threat posed by the Ilkhanid's bloodline through a variety of means. The most 
interesting policy was the Mamluk attempts to marry into the Chinggisid line. Irwin 
stated: "[the fact that] the Mongols still retained their social prestige is indicated by the 
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series of missions sent by the Sultan to the lands of the Golden Horde to secure a Mongol 
princess. In the end [Sultan] aI-Nasir Muhammad did briefly marry Tulubiyya, a great-
great-grand-daughter ofChingiz Khan.,,239 This marriage arrangement clearly shows the 
Mamluk desire to link into the Chinggisid line, albeit through their relationship with the 
Golden Horde. Despite being an adversary, the Mamluks still sought several marriage 
arrangements with the Ilkhanate, as illustrated in the negotiations conducted by the last 
Illillan Abu Said. Choban, the regent of Abu Said, sought policies to increase Mongol 
power, particularly through his style of negotiating marriages. He mostly showed his 
power against the Mamluk ambassadors by declining their marriage proposals, which 
showed great insult to the sultan.24o 
The second greatest threat the Ilkhanids posed to the Mamluk ruling system was 
in their conversion to Islam. The Mamluks now had a new contender for the title of 
'Guardian (Protector) ofIslam' and 'the Patron of Islam.' During the years of Mongol 
shamanist rule in Iran, the older Islamic models of legitimacy were not utilized as much. 
When the Ilkhans converted to Islam there was a fusion of Mongol and Islamic ruling 
traditions. They ruled both as divinely favored descendants of Chinggis Khan as well as 
Muslim sultans who were advised by Islamic scholars. Some Mongol rulers liked aspects 
ofIslamic kingship.241 The Ilkhan Teguder (r. 1282-1284) converted to Islam and took 
the name Ahmad and the title of' Sultan.' This conversion and subsequent ones destroyed 
the Mamluks' main case for their rule: that the Ilkhanate was an infidel oppressor and the 
Mamluks were the protectors of Muslim society and the Guardian of Islam.242 Beginning 
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with the reign of Teguder the Ilkhans vacillated between Muslim and Pagan leadership. 
Ghazan ruled as a Muslim and called himself the Guardian of Islam, making a direct 
challenge to the Mamluk sultan. Ghazan was also the first Ilkhanid ruler to break with the 
Mongol tradition of secret burial for the khan. Instead he built an Islamic mausoleum.243 
The Ilkhan Oljeitu (r. 1304-1316) continued his brother Ghazan's Islamic legacy 
upon his accession to the throne. Oljeitu's birth name was Islamic, Muhammad 
Kharbandah, and he adopted the title of 'Sultan.' Also upon his accession, he took the 
regnal title 'Oljeitu,' meaning 'Auspicious.' Oljeitu upheld Ghazan's laws, despised the 
Abbasid Caliph, and believed in his legitimacy through his descent from Chinggis Khan. 
Oljeitu's diplomatic letters still referred to the Enduring Sky (Tenggri) as God.244 Oljeitu 
himself religiously experimented before finally accepting Shia Islam,245 while his 
successor, Abu Said, was a Sunni Muslim. 
When the Ilkhan Teguder demanded submission from the Sultan Qalawun in 
September 1282, his letter and ambassador were very much influenced by Islamic 
principles. His second embassy to the Mamluk Sultanate was led by his spiritual leader 
Shaykh Abd aI-Rahman as requested by Qalawun. Teguder's letter asked only for a 
peaceful agreement and not submission, but his letter was not taken well as Qalawun 
treated the Mongol diplomats poorly after the message was heard. The Sultan kept the 
diplomats imprisoned and aI-Rahman died in Mamluk hands.246 
In both his letters and actions, Teguder was a rival to Qalawun as a virtuous 
Muslim ruler. Teguder stated that he had done the following as a virtuous Muslim ruler: 
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established Islamic law; pardoned criminals; inspected Islamic endowments; constructed 
new religious buildings; and regularized protection for pilgrimage caravans. Teguder was 
an especial threat to Qalawun's legitimacy because he founded holy buildings and acted 
as a protective sovereign over the holy cities and pilgrimages.247 Great tensions were also 
created in the patronage of the Hijaz when the regent Choban acted independently of the 
Ilkhan Abu Said and pursued policies to increase Mongol power and promote his belief in 
Mongol supremacy by conducting great building programs in Mecca and Medina. This 
certainly aggravated the Mamluks.248 Ghazan's letters took a different approach. He used 
Islamic religious thought to construct his argument that the Mamluks should submit to 
the Mongols. His argument stated that since the Ilkhan was now a Muslim, the Mongols 
and Mamluks were fellow brothers, and the Mamluks had nothing to fear in joining the 
Ilkhan's subjects. Ghazan implied that he would restore rule to kings rather than it remain 
with slaves, i.e. the Mamluks.249 
The Mamluks countered the Mongol threat to their political superiority in the 
Hijaz by proclaiming religious superiority as a result of their earlier conversion to Islam. 
The Mamluk Sultan Muhammad proclaimed himself 'first among Muslim equals. ,250 
Muhammad's argument was that the Mamluks had been practicing Muslims for a much 
longer time than the Mongols and therefore could offer sounder religious guidance and 
protection to the lands ofIslam, the Dar ai-Islam. The Sultan Qalawun also utilized the 
concept of precedence in conversion to counter the Ilkhan Teguder's demand for 
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submission.251 Since Qalawun had converted to Islam first, he was senior in religion to 
Teguder; therefore Teguder could not make such demands of Qalawun. It also meant that 
as a senior in religion, Qalawun was more fit to rule (and to keep his position) than 
Teguder. The Mamluks encountered this religious threat in the 1320s and the first half of 
the 1330s because as the weakening Ilkhanid military ceased to be a threat to the 
Mamluks, the Ilkhans sought different avenues to challenge the power of the Mamluk 
sultans. The Ilkhans pursued the mantle of the primary religious patron of the Islamic 
world, a title long held by the Mamluk sultans,252 but ultimately failed in this venture. 
During the reigns of the first Muslim Ilkhans, the Mamluk sultans found it most 
effective to attack the Ilkhans' sincerity in their conversions to Islam. According to Ibn 
Abd al-Zathir, who was a historian and head chancery official of Baybars and Qalawun, 
Teguder's conversion was fake and he was portrayed as a false convert.253 But by the 
time of the Ilkhan Ghazan, the Mamluks found more success in combating the Mongols 
by proving that the Ilkhan was not a good Muslim ruler, instead of refuting his 
conversion.254 The Mamluks refuted Ghazan's statement of having God's support by 
saying that Ghazan was misguided for claiming God's approval and that God actually 
supported the Mamluks.255 
An even more potent threat to the Mamluks was when the Ilkhanid Mongols 
combined Islam with their superior Chinggisid lineage. In Ghazan Khan's letters to the 
sultan, written around his October 1299 campaign into Syria and his victory at the battle 
of Wadi al-Khaznadar, he expressed the superiority of his Chinggisid heritage by 
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utilizing Islamic chancery practices and conventions. The utilization of both Islamic and 
Mongol symbols allowed the Ilkhans to combat both the Mamluks and other peoples on 
superior ideological grounds.256 This double utilization occurred on some of Ghazan's 
minted coins; some had both Mongolian and Arabic names for God, Tenggri and 
Allah.257 
Ghazan provides a good example of this double utilization. As a Muslim, Ghazan 
stated that he was the 'divinely chosen arbiter of justice' and as such he could give 
authority to those he chose. Ghazan said that God bestowed royal authority on Chinggis 
Khan and that he was the sixth in this illustrious line.258 This belief perfectly melded the 
two ideologies. Ghazan boasted the prestige of his bloodline, while showing that the 
Islamic God favored Chinggis Khan. Ghazan was an appropriate ruler on both accounts. 
Another negative consequence of the Mamluks' wars with the Ilkhanate was the 
threat and actual loss of some of their Ayyubid allies. Sunqur al-Ashqar, the viceroy of 
Damascus, went against the Sultan Qalawun and declared his ruling independence in 
Damasacus. The Mongols under the general Mongke Temur and their Armenian allies 
took advantage of the fight between Qalawun and Sunqur al-Ashqar, possibly at Sunqur's 
urging, and sacked Aleppo in 1260. But the Mamluks were politically victorious in 
regaining Sunqur's allegiance and Mongol progress was stopped at the battle of Homs in 
1281.259 Other difficult Ayyubid princes included AI-Nasir Yusuf, who continually 
vacillated his support, and AI-Mughith Umar of Karak, who was accused of treating with 
the Mongols. The Mamluks also had to contend with other weak links in the region, 
256 The usage of Mongolian ideas and terms in letters addressed to the Mamluks often weakened Ghazan's 
position as a Muslim, so his ideas were put into Islamic terms, see Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology, 84. 
257 Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology, 66. 
258 Ibid. 79. 
259 Northrup, "The Bahri Mamluk sultanate," 274-75. 
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namely Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli, who was connected to the Cilician Armenian 
family through marriage, hence he allied with Armenia and the Mongols.26o 
Additionally, circumstances that began as advantageous for the Mamluks quickly 
proved to be of a more duplicitous nature. The Mamluks gained numerous highly skilled 
Mongol warriors, who were either rebels from the Ilkhanid army or displaced refugee 
nomadic peoples pushed into Mamluk territory. These refugees began arriving in late 
1261 from Hiilegii's army.261 These Mongols were incorporated into the Mamluks' 
second most talented military unit, the Wafidiyya, and proved their fighting abilities. But 
some of these Mongol units created political turmoil in the Mamluk army. One such 
example occurred in the winter of 1299, when Ghazan Khan crossed the Euphrates River 
with a mixed army of Mongols, Armenians and Georgians, along with the Mamluk emirs 
Qibjaq and Baktimur. While on their way against Ghazan's army, the Mamluk army was 
thrown into turmoil by a rebellious plot hatched by the Mongol Oirat Wafidiyya. They 
planned to murder the sultan and his officers and put the Mongol mamluk Kitbugha back 
on the sultan's throne.262 Although this plot was foiled and hundreds ofOirats were 
killed, it showed the military disasters that could occur when dealing with Mongol 
dissidents. 
The Ilkhanate also presented a significant threat to Egyptian commercial interests 
and their presence negatively impacted the operations of the Mamluk Sultanate. To what 
extent the Ilkhanate's actions crippled the Sultanate is less clear. The Ilkhanate's 
operations in Cilician Armenia significantly threatened the Mamluks' access to the 
mamluk slave-trading region in the Black Sea. As Northrup explained: 
260 Ibid. 274. 
261 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 106. 
262 Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 99-100. 
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Critical. .. was the threat posed to the slave trade, vital to the existence of 
the Mamluk regime, which was conducted along routes passing through 
Mongol territory. Increasingly this concern became intertwined with the 
competition in the region for the east-west trade. Indeed, it is clear that 
commercial concerns underlay much of Mamluk diplomatic and even 
military activity during the Bahri period. 263 
The initial Mongol conquest and the subsequent re-conquest by Hiilegii created a 
vast new trade zone, which ran through the newly established Ilkhanate. There were two 
main routes that concerned the Ilkhans. The more established route was the southern sea 
route, which linked eastern lands via the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Nile with the 
Mediterranean.264 These southern sealanes were often under the control of the Mamluks 
and the Mamluk sultans struggled to maintain controll over this southern route from 
which they stood to reap large benefits.265 The second route was a more northerly route, 
which became an attractive alternative to the southern route and had the potential to 
undercut the Mamluks' southerly route. The Ilkhanate owned this northerly route, along 
with their Genoese allies, and competed with the Mamluk routes for a century after the 
initial Mongol conquest. The Ilkhanids allowed the Genoese access to the eastern oceans, 
but the Ilkhans were also involved in the region. The Ilkhan Arghun created a naval fleet 
in Baghdad with the intention of seizing the Mamluks' shipping lanes in the Red Sea?66 
Issues of trade and religious patronage merged to create a prolonged conflict 
between the Ilkhanids and the Mamluks in the Arabian Peninsula. Northrup provided an 
explanation of this conflict and its importance in the overall Mongol-Mamluk rivalry: 
In 1315-16, if not earlier, the Ilkhanids became involved in local rivalries 
in Mecca and sought to use them, just as the Mamluks did, to exert 
263 Northrup, "The Bahri Mamluk sultanate," 277-78. 
264 Ibid. 283. 
265 Ibid. 277-78. 
266 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 181. 
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influence. Though an effort to conquer the Hijaz by the sharif of Mecca267 
with a force furnished by the Illillan Oljeitu failed, the sharif did capture 
Mecca with Mongol assistance two years later, whereupon the name of the 
Illillan Abu Said (1316-35) was mentioned in the khutba. 268 Underlying 
religious and political interests in the region, therefore, was the imperative 
to protect the Sultanate's commercial interests in the lands of the Red Sea 
basin (Arabia, Upper Egypt and Nubia, Ethiopia) and the Indian Ocean 
(e.g. Ceylon, Sind, Hind, China). Mamluk diplomatic and military 
activities in these lands must be viewed, therefore, at least partially in the 
light of these concerns.269 
Finally, the Ilkhanate created a rather difficult situation for the Mamluks when the 
Ilkhanate collapsed in 1335. The Mamluks' greatest enemy had dissipated, which left this 
military regime without an external threat. The Mamluks, as a military regime, needed a 
strong external enemy to continually justify their presence and rule. It was clear by the 
1320s and 1330s that the Ilkhanate no longer posed a military threat to the Mamluks. 
With no strong enemy to face and the coming of a period of relative peace, the Mamluk 
military structure became lax and the Mamluk ruling elite lost power. Finally, "[with] the 
disintegration of the Ilkhanid state ... the Bahri regime entered a period of peace, 
prosperity and internal stability. The military ethic that had served so well during a time 
of crisis began to deteriorate ... ,,270 Despite this setback, the Mamluks continued to rule 
Egypt for another two hundred years, unti11517. 
In summarizing the above evidence, it was clear that the Mamluks experienced 
many more positive consequences from their stance against the Ilkhanid Mongols. On 
first consideration this notion may seem surprising as the prevailing viewpoint of the time 
was that the Mongols were the most powerful and successful force in the region and it 
267 Carl F. Petry, ed., The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol I, 640-1517 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998),537. 
268 The khutbalkhutab was the sermon preached by the khatib in mosques at Friday noon prayer; also the 
acknowledgement of the Caliph or ruler, see Petry, The Cambridge History of Islam, 531. 
269 Northrup, "The Bahri Mamluk sultanate," 283. 
270 Ibid. 261-62. 
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was presumed that they would continue in this role. No one expected the Mamluks to 
defeat the Mongols at Ayn Jalut and to ultimately outlast the Ilkhanate. 
The Mamluk sultans quickly realized the benefit of the Mongol menace, utilizing 
its threat as a way to solidify their ruling legitimacy. This was especially important since 
the Mamluks had just taken the Egyptian throne. The Mamluks also actively attacked the 
religious legitimacy of the Ilkhanate, both before and after the Ilkhans' conversion to 
Islam. This helped the Mamluks boast of their Islamic virtues and their re-establishement 
of the Caliphate in Cairo assured the Caliph's support of the Mamluk rulers. 
Some of the negative effects the Mamluks experienced from the Mongols 
included material losses, the loss of life and allies, the loss of territory and commerce, but 
most importantly, the great loss of ruling legitimacy and the continued weakness of their 
bloodline in comparison to the Chinggisids. Although it was a long hard-fought war 
against the Ilkhanate, the Mamluks were able to stop the Mongol advance. Still more 
amazing was that the Mamluks were able to capitalize on their victories over the 
Ilkhanate which propelled them to military supremacy in the Middle East. The Mamluks' 
continual resistance and pressure on the Mongols assisted in the collapse of the Ilkhanate 
in 1335. The Mamluks then sealed their revenge against the Kingdom ofCilician 
Armenia with its complete conquest in 1375. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to address a gap in the available academic literature on the 
Mongol presence in the Middle East and relations between the Ilkhanate and its 
neighbors. Some research was available on the relationship between the Mongols and the 
Mamluks; the Mamluks and Armenians; and the Mongols and the Armenians. There was 
no source dedicated directly to the study of the Ilkhanid-Armenian-Mamluk relationship. 
The study of this trifold relationship yielded numerous unique insights into the Ilkhanid 
presence in the Middle East, as well as the Mamluk relationship with the Ilkhanate and 
Armenia. This work sought to show this trifold relationship as a phenomenon of its own 
and as an adequate framework through which to study the medieval Middle East. It 
ultimately sought to provide calculations of advantages and disadvantages for both the 
Armenians and Mamluks in regards to their relationships with the Ilkhanid Mongols. The 
conclusion was that the benefits the Mamluks gained from being adversaries of the 
Ilkhanid Mongols far outweighed the negative consequences. Whereas with the 
Armenians, their alliance with the Mongol proved overwhelmingly negative. 
Owing to the comparative and expansive nature of the topic, this thesis utilized a 
plethora of different primary sources, including sources in Armenian, Persian, Arabic, 
and Syriac. All of these works were studied through English translations, both in 
complete translations and partial translations found in secondary sources. The major 
contemporary Armenian authors included Grigor of Akner, Kirakos of Ganjak, and 
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Varden Arewelci. The major Persian authors included Juwayni, Rashid aI-Din, Nasir al-
Din Tusi, and Juzjani. The most important Arabic authors for the thesis were Ibn al-Athir 
followed by Ibn Abd al-Zathir and Baybars al-Mansuri. 
The primary sources from the period studied, 1220-1335, clearly exhibited 
relationships among the Ilkhanid Mongols, the Armenians, and the Egyptian Mamluks. 
When the Mongols arrived in Persia, they seemed unstoppable. The peoples the Mongols 
encountered had to decide how they would deal with this new power player in the region. 
The Armenians, from Greater Armenia and Cilician Armenia, submitted to the Mongols 
and became Mongol vassals. The Mamluks chose an adversarial stance and were 
successful in repelling the Mongols. All three groups received political benefits from 
their relations with the other two. Such benefits included monetary and territorial gains, 
religious or political freedoms, and military protection, to name a few. Each relationship 
also bore its share of negative effects, from the mundane to catastrophic. 
The Ilkhanid Mongols' relations with the Armenians and Mamluks were shaped 
by the concept of the Divine Mandate: the Mongol belief that God (Tenggri) had 
ordained that the Mongols would rule the world. As such, the Mongols were God's 
Chosen and they served God's will through their conquests. Any people who resisted the 
Mongols were resisting God's will. This labeled them as both rebels and heretics. Also as 
a result of the Divine Mandate, the Mongols conceived of the world in a 'conqueror and 
conquered' mentality in which the Mongols were always the superior force. It also meant 
that other peoples were seen in two ways, those who submitted to the Mongols and those 
yet to submit, i.e. enemies. This framework worked well with the Armenians because 
they had submitted to the Mongols and served their new masters well. Unfortunately, the 
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Mamluks greatly challenged this framework, because the Mongols could never conquer 
them. 
There were several significant benefits the Mongols' enemies could receive if 
they submitted. The submitted kingdom/nobles could receive their lands back as well as 
receive additional land. They could also receive local jurisdiction over their lands if they 
provided consistent taxes to the Mongols. Another important benefit was the conveying 
of official pardons, which meant that those who submitted could not be prosecuted for 
their previous belligerent stance. Additionally, those who submitted could receive greater 
political benefits over their local or regional rivals, as well as possible political marriages 
to Mongol princesses and desirable military service and accolades. The Mongols also 
offered religious tolerance and promoted individuals through merit and loyal service with 
less emphasis on blood relations. The last extremely valuable benefit was the military 
protection offered by the Mongols. 
For the Greater Armenians and Cilician Armenians, their relationship with the 
Ilkhanid Mongols proved to be overwhelmingly negative. Much of the failure of the 
Annenian-Ilkhanid alliance hinged on the Mongols' inability to offer adequate military 
protection to the Annenians. The Mamluks were able to conduct numerous devastating 
raids on the Cilician-Annenians and ultimately crushed the Kingdom of Cilician 
Armenia. The Golden Horde and rebel Mongols were able to devastate the lands of 
Greater Armenia. Additonally, the Armenians had to provide substantial material and 
personnel support to the Mongols, which greatly weakened the Armenians' defenses and 
economies. In addition to great material losses, the Armenians also experienced great 
losses in human life, particularly the nobility and soldiery. 
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F or the Mamluks, their relationship as an enemy of the Ilkhanid Mongols proved 
overly advantageous and greatly aided in the meteoric rise of the Mamluks as a powerful 
kingdom. The threat of the Mongols pushed the Mamluk political factions to a unified 
purpose: to defend the kingdom. The Mamluks, who had just stolen the Egyptian throne, 
were able to solidify their control over the throne by justifiying the need for a martial 
ruling class to resist the Mongols. The continual threat of the Mongols in Syria kept the 
Mamluks on the Egyptian throne. Their numerous military victories against the 
'unstoppable' Mongols also secured their position. The Mamluks were able to gain 
further ruling legitimacy by re-establishing the Caliphate in Cairo; becoming the 
protectors of Islam; and being the defenders of the faith through jihad against the infidels, 
i.e. the Mongols and Armenians. 
Ultimately this thesis aimed to show that the study of any one of these three 
groups during the thirteenth century must include an understanding of how these three 
groups, the Ilkhanid Mongols, Armenians, and Mamluks, were connected. The Mamluks 
came into their own fighting against the Mongols and became a mighty power that ruled 
Egypt until 1517. The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia fell in 13 75 as a result of Mamluk 
attacks. Perhaps surprisingly, the Ilkhanate was the first to collapse in 1335. Although the 
Ilkhanate had a short existence, it shaped the Middle East in unexpected ways, especially 
through its relationships with the Armenians and Mamluks. The Ilkhanate stood as a 
complex society that maintained much of its Mongol character while being intimately 
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APPENDIX 
Reigns of the Rulers of the Ilkhanate, the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia, and the Mamluk 
Kingdom of Egypt 



















Muhammad Kharbandah Oljeitu 
Abu Said Bahadur 






















Hetum II, co-ruler with Toros III 
Sempad, usurper 
Constantine I 
Hetum II, reclaimed the throne, abdicated and regent for Lewon III 


























AI-Muizz Aybeg al-Turkmani 
AI-Mansur Ali b. Aybeg 
AI-Muzaffar Qutuz 
AI-Zathir Baybars al-Bunduqdari 
AI-Said Berke Khan b. Baybars 
AI-Adil Sulamish b. Baybars 
AI-Mansur Qalawun b. Alfi 
AI-Ashraf Khalil b. Qalawun 
AI-Nasir Muhammad b. Qalawun (first reign) 
AI-Adil Ketbugha 
AI-Mansur Lachin 
AI-Nasir Muhammad b. Qalawun (second reign) 
AI-Muzaffar Baybars al-lashnakir 
AI-Nasir Muhammad b. QaIawun (third reign) 
Various descendants of aI-Nasir Muhammad until 1382 
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MAPS 
Map 1. Asia after 1260 CE, showing territory under Mongol control and the Mongol 
Khanates.271 
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Map 2. The Mongols in the Middle East.272 











Map 3. The Kingdom ofCilician Annenia (1199-1375).273 
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